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IMPACT OF RELIGIOUS FACTORS
IN NEBRASKA ADOPTIONS
Dale W. Broeder*
Frank J. Barrei**
I. INTRODUCTION
A.

IN GENERAL

The basic purpose here is to state the degree of significance
currently attached to religious factors in Nebraska adoption cases.
Nebraska adoption agency practices and the attitudes and practices of the county judges whose duty it is in Nebraska to approve
adoptions are surveyed and the findings pitted against a backdrop of relevant statutes and caselaw and such social science
literature as exists on the question.
The study has been undertaken for several reasons. One
reason is simply the ever-growing importance of adoption as a
legal and social institution. According to a recent estimate of
the United States Children's Bureau approximately 93,000 children were named in petitions for adoption filed in United States
courts in 1955.' This compares with about 50,000 such petitions
filed in 1944, an increase of 86%. The continuing nature of the
trend is illustrated by many factors, chief among them the evermounting illegitimacy rate2 and the persistently large number of
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1 Adoptions in the United States and its Territories (1955), Children's
Bureau Statistical Series No. 39 at 1 (1957).
2 "According to National Office of Vital Statistics figures, there were
129,700 children born out of wedlock in 1948 and 150,300 in 1952.
The illegitimacy rate per 1,000 unmarried female population aged
fifteen to forty-four years, increased from 12.7 in 1948 to 15.2 in
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homes annually broken by divorce, separation and death.3 The
increased number of children annually available for adoption,
however, has by no means kept pace with the demand. Our
standard of living is higher now than ever before; the number
of cbildless couples in our population has steadily increased; and
the press have made adoption socially acceptable. The result
has been a flood of adoptive applicants and too few children to
go around. Many estimates place the number of couples annually
seeking to adopt children at one million and the number of children available for adoption at seventy-five thousand, about one
child for every twelve couples. 4 And agency waiting lists-in
Nebraska as elsewhere in the nation-grow longer every year.
Again, and as a corollary of the point just made, adoption
agencies are today in a position to pick and choose from a vast
reservoir of eager-to-please adoptive applicants and to give controlling weight to an ever-expanding number of individual factors. In earlier times agency and/or judicial dissatisfaction with
an applicant's "religious background" often had to be overlooked
if the child was to be placed. Today such dissatisfaction can
easily be made decisive; other applicants, equally well qualified
in other respects and with the proper religious qualifications, are
readily available as substitutes.
Also important as a basis for the study is the heated campaign currently being waged by social work groups to make
independent adoptive placements illegal (save in the case of close
relatives of the child) and to require that all placements first
be approved either by a state agency or by some agency licensed

1952; the ratio of illegitimate births per 1,000 registered live births

increased from 36.7 in 1948 to 39.1 in 1952." 1 Schapiro, A Study of
Adoption Practice 9 (1956).
The inter-dependence of illegitimacy and adoption is well-established. For example, among the children for .whom adoption petitions were filed by unrelated petitioners in 1955, 73 per cent were
born out of wedlock. Adoptions in the United States and its Territories, supra, note 1 at 2.
3 Of the 27 per cent of the children born in wedlock and placed for
adoption with unrelated petitioners in 1955, about 4 per cent were
children who had lost one or both parents through death, 12 per
cent of the parents were living but divorced, and 6 per cent of the
parents were living together. While the parental status of 5 per
cent of the children was unknowfh the data seem to indicate that a
majority were children whose parents were divorced or dead. Ibid.
4 See, e.g., Fishbein, Children for the Childless (1954).
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and approved by the state.5 Justifiable as this campaign may be,
it certainly behooves us before abolishing independent placements
to take a close look at the requirements, religious and otherwise,
presently insisted upon by the agencies. Presumably these requirements would still obtain after introduction of any such reform. Apart from any question of reform, however, it should
be noted that 56% of the children annually adopted by unrelated
petitioners are currently placed by agencies rather than independently and that the percentage of independent placements in
relation to agency placements seems annually to be declining."
Finally, few if any phases of the adoptive process have been
the subject of more bitterness and controversy than the matter
of religion.7 Perhaps the most intense of the battles has been
over the enactment and wisdom of the now fairly common "religious protection" statutes which require that children of a given
faith, (including those too young meaningfully to possess any
faith), must, if practicable, be placed with adoptive parents of
the same faith.8 The controversy, however, has a wider and more
important front. Thoughtful students of the question-among
them lawyers, judges, religious leaders and social workers-appear
markedly to differ on the degree of legitimacy and relevance of
5 See, e.g., the discussion in 1 Schapiro, op. cit. supra note 2 at 109

et seq. And see Comment, Moppets on the Market: The Problem of
Unregulated Adoptions, 59 Yale L.J. 715 (1950).
6 Adoptions in the United States and its Territories, op. cit. supra note
1 at 2. The 56 per cent figure is for 1955. Of the 56 per cent of
the children so placed by the agencies 3 of every 5 children were
placed by voluntary rather than public agencies. Children placed
independently, i.e., without social agency help, were almost equally
distributed between those placed by parents or relatives (21%) and
those placed by others, (23%). Ibid.
7 See Pfeffer,. Religion in the Upbringing of Children, 35 Boston U.L.
Rev. 333 (1955) and in some ways an even more provocative statement of the conflicting positions by the same author in Pfeffer, Issues that Divide, 12 J. of Social Issues (No. 3) 21 et seq. (1956). And
see two articles by Hager, Religious Conflict, 12 J. of Social Issues
(No. 3) 3 (1956) and Race, Nationality and Religion, 3 NPPA J. 129
(1957).
s In addition to the articles cited in note 7 supra, see the following,
generally less heated discussions of such statutes: Comment, Religion
as a Factor in Proceedings for Adoption and Custody of Children,
1957 U. of Ill. L. Rev. 114; Note, Religion as a Factor in Adoption,
Guardianship and Custody, 54 Col. L. Rev. 377 (1954); Note, The Religious Protection Clause in New York's Children's Court Acts, 28
St. John's L. Rev. 276 (1954); Note, Religious Factors in Adoption, 28
Ind. L. J. 401 (1953). And see Pfeffer, Church, State and Freedom,
578 et seq. (1953).
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religious factors in adoption 9 and the question of whether such
factors should normally be accorded any weight at all has many
times squarely been raised.'
First Amendment doctrines have
been appealed to, along with the historically somewhat questionable "tradition" of separation of church and state. The debate
has for the most part been conducted in a vacuum. The typical
presentation consists of argument one way or another based on
unsystematized experience and/or appeals to authority. As a
matter of fact, we know precious little, almost nothing, about
the relation of religious training to good citizenship and the good
life and our social scientist friends have not yet done much to
enlighten us." Perhaps they never can; the problem of the relationship may be insoluable. This is not to say that no reliable
studies exist; there are some and while for the most part inconclusive, they certainly cannot be ignored.
The paucity of social science studies on the relation of religious training to behavior is paralleled on the legal side by an
almost complete lack of statutes and caselaw concerning the
importance of religion in adoption. There are, to be sure, the
religious protection statutes already mentioned and these have
spawned some litigation. Petition of Goldman, 1 2 in which the
Massachusetts Court refused to permit the adoption by a Jewish
couple of infant twins they had cared for almost from birth
solely because the twins' mother, though consenting to the adoption, was nominally a Catholic, is perhaps the most famous recent example. But such statutes and the cases they engender,
while doubtless of importance, deal after all with only one religious factor in adoption, the question of crossing religious lines
between the child's mother and the adoptive parents. . On many
9 E.g., "The (Child Welfare League) adoption workshop was not of one

mind regarding the influence of religion in the development of the
child." Adoption Practices and Problems, Child Welfare League of
America 35 (1952). And see the discussion at page 667, infra.
10 See the Pfeffer articles referred to in note 7 supra.
11 "Claims regarding the alleged . . .value of religious training and commitment ... are the subject of considerable controversy in social
work circles. The controversy continues without satisfactory resolution

chiefly because too little research and documentary evidence have
accompanied the frequent assertions of the value of social control and
'social adjustment.'" Hager, Race, Nationality and Religion, op. cit.
supra note 7 at 133. And see Chein, Research Needs, 12 J. of Social
Issues (No. 3) 57 (1956); Reuss, Research Findings on the Effects of
Modem-Day Religion on Family Living, 16 Marr. & Fain. Living 221

12

(Aug., 1954); Schnepp and Johnson, Do Religious Background Factors
Have Predictive Value, 14 Marr. & Fain. Living 301 (Nov., 1952).
331 Mass. 647, 121 N.E.2d 843 (1954), cert. den., 348 U.S. 942 (1955).
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important questions-the significance of the religiously mixed
marriage, for example, or on the weight to be attached to church
membership and church attendance-the adoption cases are virtually silent and the legal rules governing the emphasis which
may legitimately be attached to such factors must necessarily
be inferred, from the way in which they are dealt with in such
related areas as custody, guardianship and dependency. In any
event, the Nebraska situation is typical. There is not a single
reported case dealing with religious factors or even one such
factor in an adoption context. A half-dozen custody and guardianship opinions touch on such matters but that is all.

B. EMPIRICAL STUDIES
As noted above, the empirical side of the study has two parts,
one focusing on Nebraska's adoption agencies, the second on the
county judges whose responsibility it is in the first instance in
Nebraska to approve or to deny petitions for adoption. Information concerning the agencies was gathered both through personal
interviews with the heads or assistant heads of the agencies and
by means of a written questionnaire similar to one sent to the
judges. The questionnaire to the agencies was necessary in order
to make the judge and agency data comparable and to fill in
certain gaps in the interview data. The agencies, while extremely
cooperative, nevertheless in many cases found it difficult to give
specific answers during the interviews.
1.

Nebraska Adoption Agencies
While Nebraska has ten licensed adoption agencies three of
them, the Family Service Association of Lincoln, the Family and
Child Service of Omaha and the Jewish Federation of Omaha together annually handle less than 2% of all adoptions and for
this reason are here excluded from study. Of the seven remaining agencies, four, the Lutheran Children's Service, the Immanuel
Children's Home and the Catholic agencies of Lincoln and Omaha
ordinarily at least only handle applicants for adoption one or
both of whom are members of their respective faiths or denominations-Catholic or one or the other of the two branches of the
Lutheran church. 13 The Nebraska Child Welfare Department, on
the other hand, considers applicants of all faiths while the Ne13 Agency restriction of their services to applicants of a given faith is

by no means solely a Nebraska phenomonon. A 1954 national survey
of adoption agencies revealed that over half of the 270 responding
agencies limited their services to persons of specified religions. This,
of course, is accounted for by the sectarian nature of many of the
agencies. 1 Schapiro, op. cit. supra note 2 at 78.

646
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braska Children's Home and the Child Saving Institute consider
all except Lutherans, Catholics and Jews all of whom they refer
to their own respective agencies. Jewish applicants, it would appear, as a practical matter have no place to go except the State
agency since their own agency has not had any children available for adoption for several years. The various agencies, together with the number of their completed adoptions to nonrelated petitions for 1957 and their respective percentages of the
a
total agency cases are as follows: 14
Percentage
of Cases
Name
No. of Cases
Nebraska Children's Home Society
Office of Child Welfare (State)
Child Saving Institute
Catholic Social Service Bureau of Omaha
Catholic Social Service Bureau (Lincoln)
Lutheran Children's Home Society
Immanuel Children's Home
Family Service Ass'n of Lincoln
Family and Child Service of Omaha
Jewish Federation of Omaha

92
60
48
48
34
29
11
3
2
0

28.19
18.34
14.67
14.67

327

100.00

10.39
8.86
3.36
0.91
0.61
0.00

It should be noted at the outset that all of the agencies ask
numerous questions concerning religious connections and either
require or at least normally expect supporting references from
clergymen.'
In several cases such references are asked for in
connection with the application for adoption. Furthermore, all
agencies check on the reliability of the information given, generally through interviews with clergymen and neighbors. Nothing on the religious side seems to be taken for granted. Religion
is vitally important for the agencies though, to be sure, all recognize and likewise always search for an "overemphasis" on religion. Getting the agencies to define "overemphasis" however
was another matter; nor would they name religious names. Inquiry into such matters was uniformly fruitless. Nearly fruitless
Table is based on agency questionnaire on file at the College of Law.
1r This practice, too, is not confined to Nebraska agencies though it
does appear that ours are more insistent and curious in this regard
than most. Thus only 142 out of 270 agencies in the national survey
mentioned in note 13 listed religion as an important factor in determining eligibility for adoption. 1 Schapiro, op. cit. supra note 2
at 75.
14
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also was our effort to determine how often during the past five
years applicants had been turned down on account of religious
factors. However, something was learned. Several agencies indicated that they had frequently rejected applications where the
applicants were of different religions and all admitted that they
sometimes did so. However with two exceptions none had ever
to their knowledge been faced with an agnostic or an atheist or
even very often with persons whom they considered "not sufficiently religious." Nevertheless, all admitted that they had
"sometimes" refused placements because of insufficient religion
and two agencies, the State and the Child Saving Institute, candidly indicated that they had frequently done so in part on this
ground. The two agencies last mentioned had also to some extent encountered atheists and agnostics and admitted denying
placements to them. Unfortunately the two Catholic agencies
were not asked about any of the above matters.
2. Nebraska County Judges
While the study was initially intended only to cover agencies
it soon appeared that a questionnaire survey of the county judges
would also be useful. In the first place, at least insofar as religious factors are concerned, the county courts in adoption cases
are as a practical matter our courts of last resort. Our Supreme
Court has not, except in the most oblique way, yet been afforded
an opportunity to speak out and judging from experience elsewhere will probably not soon be afforded any such opportunity.
Indeed, there is. an unreal quality about all of the cases and literature dealing with the legal relevance of religion in adoption.
Agency practice in screening out the "religiously undesirable"
generally keeps religious factors out of court adoption cases and
most of what little directly relevant caselaw there is stems from
Nor at least in Nebraska is there legislation
agency mistakes.'
16 E.g., Petition of Goldman, 331 Mass. 647, 121 N.E.2d 843 (1954) cert.

den., 348 U.S. 942 (1955); Palmer v. Smith, 183 Or. 617, 195 P.2d 708
(1948); and cf. In re McKenzie, 197 Minn. 234, 266 N.W. 746 (1936).
In connection with the Goldman case it is interesting to note
that the Massachusetts Department of Public Welfare has acted to
prevent a repetition of the Goldman affair. Massachusetts law provides that except in the case of close relatives no adoption can be
allowed which does not have the approval of an agency licensed by
the Department of Public Welfare. The Department has promulgated
a regulation to the effect that no agency will be authorized to approve adoptions if it allows adoptions across religious lines, (as between the child or the child's natural mother and the adoptive parents).

See Pfeffer, Religion in the Upbringing of Children, op. cit.

supra note 7 at 387-388.

NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
on the subject, only a religious protection statute covering the
small number of children found to be neglected, dependent or
delinquent under the Juvenile Court Act. 17 Knowing the "law"
here then, in the curious way that knowing the law is important
in this context, means knowing the attitudes and practices of
county judges. What standards are being employed and to what
extent do the judges act uniformly? The subsidiary nature of
this objective however must again be stressed. It must be recognized that our county courts in adoption cases are often in
practice required to act in an almost administrative capacity.
As the child has already been placed in the custody. of the petitioners for six months' s and as no one else is usually available
to take custody the county judges are not normally in any position to deny a petition, whether on religious grounds or otherwise.' 9 This must constantly be borne in mind in interpreting
the significance of the data.
Again, there is the matter of independent placements. If
adoption statistics for the nation as a whole are any criterion,
Nebraska's adoption agencies handle just over 50% of all adoptions to non-related petitioners; the remainder, "handled independently, are generally in Nebraska scrutinized solely in the county
courts. Finally a survey of county judge attitudes is valuable
from the standpoint merely of learning what a significant group
of workers in the field of adoption think. Certainly the judges'
notions on the degree of significance properly to be attached to
religious factors in adoption are entitled to as much weight as
the often high-flown pronouncements and assumptions of those
persons, experienced and otherwise, who have already chosen to
speak. Furthermore, no one has heretofore bothered to ask judges
what they think.
The questionnaire was first mailed to the judges in November, 1957, and a second mailing in January, 1958, gained a few
"The court in committing children under the provisions of this act
shall place them as far as practicable in the case and custody of
some individual holding the same religious belief as the parents of
the child, or with some association which is controlled by persons
of like religious faith of the parents of the child." Neb. Rev. Stat.
§ 43-216( Reissue 1952). As indicated in the text, the Juvenile Court
Act only covers children found to be delinquent, dependent or neglected.
18 Neb. Rev. Stat. § 43-109 (Reissue 1952).
19 The respective number of petitions granted and denied by the county
judges cooperating in the study' for the period 1955-1957 will be found
at page 650, infra.
17

RELIGIOUS FACTORS IN NEBRASKA ADOPTIONS

649

additional responses. The number of responses exceeded all expectation. Questionnaires were returned by 76 of Nebraska's 93
county judges. To be sure, many of the questionnaires were not
completed but the number of completions was also surprising.
Approximately 60 judges, almost two-thirds of the total, answered
every question, a statistic, incidentally, which compares very
favorably with the results of a 1956 self-poll of the judges concerning their own retirement system. Volunteered comments by
the judges dealt both with the worthwhileness of the undertaking
and with the legal and social relevance of religious factors in
adoption. Comments of the former type, however, predominated
and ran the gamut from enthusiastic endorsement of the study
to bitter denunciation. Comments on the importance of religious
factors in adoption, while less numerous, likewise covered a broad
range and, in general, paralleled in extended personal form the
divergence of attitudes so discernable in the answers given to
the questions on the questionnaire. Some judges attached great
and in a few situations controlling importance to religious matters,
others not so much and still others none or almost none at all.
The data of course must be taken with a certain amount of
salt. In addition to previous caveats, it must be admitted that
questionnaires are at best but a poor vehicle for obtaining information of the type desired and the questionnaire employed is
hardly recommended as a model. Some of the questions proved
to be absolutely meaningless while others were largely so. Again,
some important matters had for practical reasons to be left out
or were simply overlooked-the judges' approach to "excessive"
religious zeal on the part of the adoptive parents, for example,
and what the judges would consider to be an "overemphasis" on
religion. Furthermore, the questionnaire took no account of the
fact that many of the county judges would be personally acquainted
with most of their adoptive petitioners and thus would have no
need for asking questions about religious matters. The effect
of this, of course, was to distort the meaning of those questions
designed to determine what was said about religion during the
adoption hearing.
One final point. Implicit in the questionnaire method is the
danger that the questionnaire will not be taken seriously, that
answers will be given hurriedly and without due reflection. Doubtless this sometimes happened. Two clues however give some
assurance that on the whole the judges took us seriously. One
is the large number of personal comments appended by the judges
to the questionnaires. A second lies in the consistency of the
judges' responses. The responses make sense both as a group
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and individually. For example, the number of judges placing
heavy emphasis on religion remains relatively constant throughout all segments of the questionnaire and an individual judge
attaching great importance to religion in one connection likewise does so in related connections.
The questionnaire has four major parts which deal respectively with 1) protecting the religion of the child's natural mother
or of the child himself; 2) the religiously mixed marriage; 3)
church membership and church attendance; and 4) atheistic and
agnostic applicants for adoption. Throughout a distinction is
drawn between the case of an infant and that of a child old enough
to have received religious training. "Half-adoption" cases, where
the petitioner is a step-parent of the child, are expressly excluded
from study. Another basic dimension of the questionnaire is that
while the judges are given numerous hypothetical cases to decide
a check is provided in that they are likewise asked to indicate
the extent to which they ask the questions which would elicit the
information necessary to apprise them of the existence of possibly unfavorable religious factors. A copy of the questionnaire
will be found in Appendix A, page 684.
In addition to the major points an effort was also made to
learn something of the number of adoption petitions annually
granted and denied and of the general nature of the cases, the
percentage involving stepparents and the percentage involving infants as distinguished from children old enough to have received
religious training. Inquiry was also directed at the extent to
which the judges avail themselves of their discretionary power
to order an investigation of the adoptive parents by the Board of
Control or by some licensed agency where, but for their action,
no such investigation would be made. 20 The data obtained, for
what they are worth, are as follows. The 64 judges responding
to this portion of the questionnaire granted 1458 petitions in the
two years prior to the study and denied only 14.21 Of the total
number of petitions ruled on by these judges during this period
approximately 44% involved step-parents, 33% were cases other
than step-parent cases involving infants and '22% were non-stepparent cases involving children old enough to have received religious training. The Board of Control or some licensed agency,
20
21

Neb. Rev. Stat. § 43-107 (Reissue 1952).
The small number of denials reflects the national pattern. The number of adoption petitions annually denied in the United States is
"negligible." See 1 Schapiro, A Study of Adoption Practice, op. cit.
supra note 2 at 26.
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incidentally, was required to consent to the adoption in 66% of
the non-step-parent infant cases and in 95% of the non-step-parent
cases involving children with previous religious training.22 In
infant cases, 31% of the judges always (13%) or generally (18%)
employ their discretionary power to require an investigation of
the adoptive parents where otherwise no such investigation would
be made while 69% of them never (47%) or only occasionally
do (22%). The situation is approximately the same where children old enough to have religious training are concerned. Here
30% always (10%) or generally (20%) require an investigation
while 70% seldom (20%) or never (50%) do so. Let us now
turn to the major findings.
II.

CROSSING RELIGIOUS LINES; THE NATURAL
MOTHER VS. THE ADOPTIVE PARENTS

A. NON-DEDICATED CHImD; ADOPTIVE

PARENTS' RELIGION

DIFFERS FROm NATURAL MOTHER

The first case considered is that of an infant not dedicated
to any faith by a ritual such as baptism who is sought for adoption by persons of a faith different from that of the child's natural
mother. Thus far at least, particularly when the child's natural
mother has no objection, this type of case has set off more controversy than any other.23 The context, of course, has been the
religious protection statutes mentioned above and such statutes
when applied to bar an adoption in such a case have many times
vigorously been challenged as unconstitutional. Insistence upon
a religious identity between the child's natural mother and the
petitioners, it is argued, cannot be justified in the name of the
child who has no religion, 24 interferes with the religion of the
adoptive parents who must change theirs in order to get the
child and abridges the religious freedom of the natural mother
who, if she wants the child adopted by petitioners, must change
hers to theirs. All of this, it is claimed, amounts to state action
in furtherance of religion in violation of the First and Fourteenth
Amendments. The merits of such arguments will not here be
22 Neb. Rev. Stat. § 43-105 (Reissue 1952).
23 Supra, notes 7, 8.

24 That is, in the sense of understanding it.

Doctrinally, the situation

may be quite different. The Jewish religion, for example, takes the
position that every child born of a Jewish mother automatically becomes a Jew. See Duker, Jewish Attitudes to Child Adoption, in
2 Schapiro, A Study of Adoption Practice 134 at 143 (1956).
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examined. Suffice it to say that they have only occasionally
been successful 25 and that the United States Supreme Court has
not yet spoken. Nor is this likely. Conflict of laws problems
aside, family law is2 6one area from which the Court has traditionally stood aloof.
Nebraska law on the question seems fairly clear. Our religious protection statute by its very terms applies only to children committed under the Juvenile Court Act and the ultimate
test for an adoption in Nebraska is the "best interests of the
child."2 7 Considering the fact that it is the mother's and not
the infant's religious interest which is at stake here, this test
would seem to dictate the granting of the petition, assuming, of
course, that the petitioners are in other respects well qualified.
On the other hand, State ex rel. Bize v. Yount,2 8 involving a
guardianship fight between two sets of non-relatives over a ten
year old child, contains language which might impliedly extend
the religious protection statute to cover adoptions outside of the
Juvenile Court Act. 29 This is true, however, only on the most
strained construction of the case. On balance, the possibility that
Nebraska's law requires a religious identity between the infant's
natural mother and the adoptive parent seems very remote in-

deed.
Be this as it may, three of Nebraska's seven major adoption*
agencies, representing 34% of all 1957 agency adoptions, automatically refuse an adoption in any case where the infant's natural
mother and the adoptive applicants do not possess the same major
basic faith. And this is apparently true though the natural mother
would not object to or would even favor a placement of her infant across religious lines. A fourth agency, handling 15% of
the cases, regards a lack of religious identity as "unfavorable"
while a fifth, handling 3% of the cases, though checking "only
slightly unfavorable," indicated that it had sometimes refused
25 Cf. Cooper v. Henricks, 10 Ill.2d 269, 140 N.E.2d 293 (1957); State
ex rel, Baker v. Bird, 253 Mo. 569, 162 S.W. 119 (1913); Jones v.
Bowman, 13 Wyo. 79, 77 Pac. 439 (1904). And see Fratum v. Dept.
of Welfare, 214 Md. 100, 133 A.2d 408, 412, 413 (1957), cert. den. 355
U.S. 882 (1958); In Re Adoption of Minor, 228 F.2d 446, 448 (App.
D.C., 1955).
26 See In re Burrus, 136 U.S. 586, 593-594 (1890); Barber v. Barber, 62
U.S. 582, 584 (1858).
27 Neb. Rev. Stat. § 43-109 (Reissue 1952).
28
29

121 Neb. 619, 237 N.W. 677 (1931).
Id., at 631, 632.
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placement in part on this ground. On the other hand, the State
agency and the Nebraska Children's Home, handling 18% and
28% of the cases respectively, attach no importance to the question normally though the latter would do so should a specific
request be made by the natural mother. It almost goes without
saying that all of the agencies make a point of inquiring about
the faith of the natural mother and, a fortiori, of the faith of
the applicants for adoption.
On the whole the judges seem to attach considerably less
importance to the matter. Thus only 37% of the judges always
(21%) or generally (16%) inquire about it as compared with
62% who only occasionally (10%) or never (52%) inquire. No
judge would bar an adoption on this ground and 65% indicated
that a lack of religious identity between the infant's natural
mother and the petitioners would either have no effect (45%)
upon them or only a slightly unfavorable effect (20%). On the
other hand, 35% of the judges thought that a lack of such identity
was either extremely unfavorable (14%) or unfavorable (21%).
Such percentages, of course, are considerable and in the light
of the agency behavior described above demonstrate that in practice the policy of the religious protection statutes has significant
weight in Nebraska.

B. DEDICATED CHImD; ADOPTIVE PARENTS OF DIFFERENT FAm
Closely allied to the case just considered is that of an infant
who has been dedicated to some major basic faith by a ritual
such as baptism who is sought for adoption by persons of a different basic faith. Except for the baptism feature and for the
possibility that the baptism might have been in a faith different
from that of the infant's natural mother, the cases are exactly
the same and much of the discussion above is likewise applicable
here. In states with a broad religious protection statute, of course,
baptism normally fixes the child's faith and so far as practicable
requires him to be adopted by persons of that faith.30 In Ne30

But cf. In re Vardinakis, 160 Misc. 13, 289 N.Y.Supp. 355 (1936): "A
custom has grown up that where a child is once baptized or entered
in any prescribed manner into a church, that the child is to be treated
as belonging to that church so long as he is a minor. There is no
foundation in law for such a position." Id., at 15, 359.
The baptism problem can be exceedingly complicated under religious protection statutes when an infant is baptised without the
knowledge or consent of one or both of the parents. See the frustrated but exceedingly thoughtful remarks of the Court in In re
Glavas, 203 Misc. 590, 121 N.Y.S.2d 12 (1953).
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braska, however, the baptism probably adds nothing and the case
is the same as the one first considered. Certainly the mental
condition of the infant is no different in the two cases. Concededly, however, there is only one case and that but remotely
relevant. Kaufman v. Kaufman3 ' mentions the fact that a two
year old child had been baptised Catholic together with the
testimony of a priest that she was accordingly entitled to be
raised as a Catholic as factors to be weighed in determining the
issue of custody.
So far as the agencies as a whole are concerned baptism
does add something. The dedicated infant is somewhat less likely
to be placed across religious lines. The State agency, for example,
handling 18% of Nebraska's agency adoptions, while attaching no
importance to crossing religious lines in the case of non-dedicated
infants, regards it unfavorably in the case of baptised or dedicated
infants. Curiously, however, not all of the agencies inquire about
baptism while all inquire concerning the faith of the infant's
natural mother.
Baptism likewise adds something for the judges. While none
would automatically bar the adoption of a baptised infant across
religious lines, 57% looked upon the practice with extreme disfavor (17%) or disfavor (40%) as compared with 35% very opposed (14%) or opposed (21%) in the case of the non-dedicated
infant. Furthermore, 33% of the judges always (18%) or generally (15%) inquire whether the infant has been dedicated to a
particular faith. While this is less than the number inquiring
about the faith of the infant's natural mother, the number so
inquiring still seems surprisingly high.
C.

INSTRUCTED CHnMD; ADOPTIVE PARENTS OF DIFFERENT FAITH

The case now to be considered is quite different, that of a
child old enough to have received religious instruction who is
sought for adoption by persons of a faith different from the one
in which the child has been instructed. Adopting a baby across
religious lines is one thing; only the natural mother's religion
and perhaps sometimes the natural mother's feelings can be hurt
here. Uprooting a child previously grounded in the tenents of
one faith and exposing him to another, on the other hand, may
in some cases create serious psychological conflicts. And this
is one point at least where psychologists and social workers con31 140 Neb. 299, 301, 308, 310, 299 N.W. 617, 619, 623, 624 (1941).
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cur. Nor has the point escaped the courts. The precedents,
while few in number, go back many years. 32 Indeed, as indicating
the depth of judicial concern, it is significant that the question
of whether even natural parents have the right repeatedly to
change the religious attachments of their children has sometimes
3
been raised.3 3 An illustrative modern case is Boerger v. Boerger, 4
involving a divorce custody fight between a Catholic father and
a Lutheran mother. In resolving the custody issue the Court
felt obliged to examine the child in chambers to determine whether
her "Catholic training . . . (had) progressed so far that definite
religious ideas were impressed upon . . . (her) mind . . .to such
an extent that any change would unsettle . . . (her) tranquility
and disturb . . . (her) mental poise." Concluding that they had
not and that the child preferred Protestantism, custody was
awarded to the mother with directions to raise the child as a
Protestant and not to subject her, as she had previously been
compelled to do, to competing instruction in the Catholic religion.
However, a Nebraska case, though only remotely relevant, tends
somewhat to lean the other way. The custody of a nine year
old child in Lemke v. Gutman 35 was conditioned on the obedience
of her Catholic aunt's promise to raise her as a Lutheran notwithstanding that the child prior to the decree had been receiving
Catholic training.
Three situations were studied: (1) the common basic faith
of the adoptive parents is different from the basic faith in which
the child has received training; (2) one adoptive parent has the
same basic faith as the child while the other has a different
basic faith; and (3) the child has had instruction in one branch
of the Protestant faith while the adoptive parents belong to a
32

Stourton v. Stourton, 8 De GM & G 760, 44 Eng. Reprint 583 (1857);
see also In re Glavas, 203 Misc. 590, 121 N.Y.S.2d 12 (1953) and cases
therein cited. Consult Friedman, The Parents' Right to Control the
Religious Education of a Child, 29 Harv. L. Rev. 485, 493 et seq.

33

"It is questionable in my mind whether the courts would go the
distance in preserving the rights of parents to include therein the
right to repeatedly change the religion of a child after it had been
baptised or circumscised. If that were so, parents might change the
religion of a child periodically and even do so in all sincerity without any regard as to the impact that the changes will have upon
the child. In re Glavas, 203 Misc. 590, 121 N.Y.S.2d 12, 17 (1953).
26 N.J.Sup. 90, 97 A.2d 419, 426 (1953).
105 Neb. 251, 181 N.W. 132 (1920). See also the cases cited and discussed in notes 58 and 59 infra and accompanying text.

(1916).

34
35
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different branch. The central finding can be stated very simply:
The agencies were on the whole vitally concerned with the first
two situations whereas the judges or at least a surprising number
of them were not. Neither the agencies nor the judges were
particularly concerned with the third.
One index of interest, of course, is what the judges and agencies ask before aproving an adoption. So far as the present situations are concerned many of the judges asked very little. Probably the basic question in the present connection is whether and
to what extent the child has been instructed in a basic faith.
55% of the judges said that they either never inquired or inquired only occasionally, with 40% never inquiring at all. On
the other hand, 23% always inquired with 21% generally inquiring. And, as would be expected, even less attention was paid
to the name of the particular religious sect in which the child
might have previously been instructed. 55% of the judges said
they never asked and another 8% said that they but seldom inquired. At the same time, 13% said that they always inquired.
The situation is only slightly different on the side of the names
of the adoptive parents' basic faiths and denominations. In cases
involving children old enough to have received religious instruction, 45% of the judges always or generally request the names
of the adoptive parents' basic faiths whereas 42% never ask
and 13% ask only occasionally. Interestingly, the percentages
are about the same for cases involving infants.
Judicial interest in the names of the adoptive parents' particular denominations is even less. 50% of the judges never ask
while an additional 13% ask but seldom and the percentages
are the same whether an infant or a child with religious instruction is involved. In other words, a judge caring in one type of
case will care in another and vice versa. So far as the raw
data are concerned, there is absolutely no difference. One final
point. 58% of the judges said they never inquired concerning
the name of the particular denomination in which the child with
previous religious training would be instructed, 8% occasionally
inquired, with 34% always or generally inquiring. This represents a slight increase over the number of judges making similar
inquiries in cases involving infants. The agencies, as contrasted
with the judges, uniformly ask all of the above questions except
that the Nebraska Children's Home sometimes does not specifically inquire concerning the name of the particular denomination
to which the adoptive parents belong and the State agency does
not always ask for the name of the particular denomination in
which the child with previous religious instruction will be raised.
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Common Basic Faith of Adoptive Parents Differs
from Child's Instruction

So much for the nature and extent of judicial and agency
inquiry. Let us first take the case of the child with previous
religious instruction sought to be adopted by persons with a different basic faith. Five of the six major agencies servicing such
children would automatically bar the adoption while the sixth,
the smallest, handling only 3% of the cases, thought such a situation to be "unfavorable" and indicated that it had sometimes
refused to make a placement in such a case. The judges, on the
other hand, were considerably more lenient. 43% said that the
situation would either have no effect (30%) upon them or but
a slightly unfavorable effect (13%) with 52% regarding it as
unfavorable (31%) or extremely unfavorable (21%) and 5%
holding it to be an automatic bar. Surprisingly, the judges were
as opposed or disposed to cross religious lines in the case of a
child with previous religious training as in the case of a baptised infant. 57% were very opposed or opposed in both cases.
Apparently the crucial factor for the judges is simply the crossing of religious lines. At least the fact that the child has received religious training makes no difference.2.

One Adoptive Parent Has Same Faith as Child's Instruction

What of the case where one adoptive parent has the same
basic faith as the child while the other has a different basic faith?
The case is complicated for it involves not only a crossing of religious lines between the child and one of the adoptive parents
but a religiously mixed marriage as well. While a fair assumption perhaps is that the child will continue to be raised in the
religion in which he had previously received training this is not
certain and in any event the circumstance that the adoptive parents have different basic faiths might conceivably make the situation more objectionable from the child's standpoint than where
he is transplanted from one basic faith to a home where both
parties have a different basic faith, but where it is the same.
However, the agencies do not so view it. Indeed, Nebraska's
two Catholic agencies, representing 25% of all agency cases, had
no objection whatever provided only that one of the adoptive
parents is a Catholic in good standing. The Protestant and nonsectarian agencies on the other hand were generally opposed
and two of them, handling 37% of the cases, would regard the
situation as raising an automatic bar to placement. Of the two
remaining agencies servicing children old enough to have had
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religious training one views it as extremely unfavorable and the
other as unfavorable noting that it has sometimes refused placements on such a ground.
The judicial approach was again more lenient than that of
the agencies and more lenient, too, than when the judges were
asked what they would do when the adoptive parents were both
of the same faith which faith is different from the basic faith
of the child. In the "one-common faith" situation 52% of the
judges either had no qualms (30%) or only a slight qualm (22%)
about granting the petition. On the other hand, 46% of the
judges were either opposed (28%) or extremely opposed (18%)
while 2% would automatically deny the petition. The diversity
of opinion among the judges is again quite marked.
3.

Adoptive Parents and Child of Different Branch
of ProtestantFaith

The final case in the series involves a child previously instructed in one branch of the Protestant faith sought for adoption by a couple belonging to a different branch. Here at least
there was substantial unanimity. However much some Protestants
might think they are divided such diviseness does not, in the
opinion of most agencies and judges, trickle down to their child
parishioners such that the switching of a child's allegiance from
one branch to another would present any serious problems. Thus
of the four major agencies handling Protestant children old
enough to have received religious training, two said that the
situation would have no effect upon them while a third indicated
that it would have only a slightly unfavorable effect. The fourth
such agency however, a sectarian one servicing approximately
9% of the cases, looked upon it as one in which they would feel
compelled automatically to bar a placement. As previously noted,
the two Catholic agencies do not handle Protestant children but
refer them to Protestant or non-sectarian agencies.
The judges saw no problem at all. Crossing of religious lines
within the Protestant faith would have no effect whatever on
67% of the judges and an additional 28% said that it would have
only a slightly unfavorable effect. Only 5% reacted unfavorably
and no judge checked either "extremely unfavorable" or "automatic bar."
III. RELIGIOUSLY MIXED MdARRIAGES
Perhaps a more interesting dimension of the study involves
the religiously mixed marriage. Two situations were examined,
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both involving infants as distinguished from children old enough
to have received religious training. In the first the adoptive
parents have different major basic faiths, Catholic and Protestant,
for example, and each regularly attends his own church. The
second poses a couple belonging to different branches of the
Protestant faith, Baptist and Presbyterian, for example, with each
parent again regularly attending his own church.
Religiously mixed marriages of both types, it should be noted,
are very numerous. One recent writer, for example, using figures derived from Catholic sources, thinks "it ... conservative
to say that today, each year, at least one-half of all Catholics
marrying find their mates outside of the Roman Catholic Church.30'
It is relevant to add that approximately one-fifth of our population is Catholic. 37 Furthermore, the number of Catholic mixed
marriages seems to be increasing. Certainly this has been the
trend. Father Thomas of St. Louis University, after an exhaustive study, concludes that there has been a gradual but steady increase in such marriages since 1910.38 Also instructive is a study
made of Lutherans who married outside their church. The study
covered a 15 year period from 1936 to 1950. Averaged in five year
periods, the percentages of Lutherans marrying outside of their
church are 46% in 1936-1940, 57% in 1941-1945, and 58% in 19461950.3 9 Data from Iowa, which since 1953 has required all marriage license applicants to state their religions, likewise indicates
a high percentage of religiously mixed marriages of all types. 4'

A. SOCIOLOGIcAL RESEARCH
What data has sociological research uncovered concerning the
nature and consequences of religiously mixed marriages? Probably the most famous study is by Landis at Michigan State. 41
For three years Landis collected information from his students
concerning their parents' marriages. In all, he studied 4,108 families including 346 marriages where Catholics had intermarried
with 305 Protestants and with 41 persons having no religious
Bossard and Boll, One Marriage Two Faiths, 55 (1957).
37 Infra, note 88.
38 Bossard and, Boll, op. cit. supra note 36 at 58.
39 Id., at 59.
40 Id., at 56.
41 Landis, Marriages of Mixed and Non-Mixed Religious Faith, 14 Am.
Sociol. Rev. 401 (1949).
36
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faith. There are several findings of interest. First of all the
most common tendency was that the children of religiously mixed
parentage, especially the daughters, followed the faith of the
mother. "Approximately 65 per cent of the boys and 75 per cent
of the girls followed the faith of the mother." 42 Landis' findings
in this regard, incidentally, are firmly supported by Bell's famous
43
study of a random sample of 13,258 Maryland youth in 1936.
Bell found that where the parents of his children had church
affiliations "but when there was a difference between the persuasion of the father and mother, there was more than twice as
strong a tendency to adopt the faith of the mother. '4 4 Parental
policy on religious instruction
in Landis' Catholic-Protestant fam45
lies was as follows:
(per cent) (per cent)
FP-MC
FC-MP
Mother took all responsibility for
religious training
42.2
33.7
Children told of both faiths; they decided 22.7
33.7
Responsibility equally divided
22.7
19.1
Took turns going to father
and mother church
6.8
6.8
Father took all responsibility
1.1
5.6
Some children with father, some
with mother
4.5
1.1
Also of interest are Landis' findings based on his students'
statements of the degree to which religious differences had handicapped their parents' marriages in mixed and non-mixed religious
marriages: 46
Degree of
Both P
Both C
FP-MC
FC-MP
Handicap
Not at all
Very little
Somewhat
Great
Very great

85.7
11.4
2.7
.2
............-

45

Id., at 405.
Bell, Youth Tell Their Story (1938).
Id., at 196.
Landis, op. cit. supra note 41 at 405.

40

Ibid.

42
43
44

87.4
8.8
2.8
1.0

59.2
21.0
13.2
5.3
1.3

45.2
20.5
23.3
5.5
5.5
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While these figures may seem to indicate that religious differences do not operate significantly to handicap religiously mixed
marriages, the "serious handicap" percentages are nevertheless
considerable and it is noteworthy that the vast bulk of the parents' disputes over religion centered around the upbringing of
the children.4 7 This was likewise true in Baber's study of 325
religiously mixed marriages where, incidentally, far more of the
marital conflicts were based on religious rather than on nonreligious factors. 48 The situation with respect to the children was
particularly bad in Catholic-Protestant marriages where the mother
rather than the father was the Protestant member. Landis' ex49
planation bears quoting:
If the mother is Protestant the marriage seems to have many
more serious problems. The Protestant mother has agreed that
the children will be baptized Catholic, and yet she can hardly
bring up her children in a faith which she herself does not accept.
Since the major responsibility for religious training falls upon
her, she will probably bring the children up in the only faith she
knows and believes in. This means that the agreement made
before marriage must be scrapped. The Catholic husband is more
apt to be a church member than the Protestant husband who
marries a Catholic. It may be quite a blow to him to find that
his wife will not have the children baptized into his faith. Conflict results since many Catholic fathers cannot give up without
a struggle. The Catholic father not only has his own conscience
to live with but he is constantly aware of the attitude of his
church and of his family when they see his children being brought
up in the Protestant faith.
Furthermore, there is at least some evidence that the amount
of conflict over religion in religiously mixed marriages involving children is largely independent of the degree of intensity of
conviction on the part of the parents. Baber, for example, found
that "there were almost as many conflicts over religion in cases
where both husband and wife claimed to be indifferent to religion
as where either or both classed themselves as moderately religious or even devout. At marriage, the young husband, honestly
believing himself to be 'emancipated' from his early religious
training, may readily promise his wife that she may bring up
47 "It is the presence of children in the home which makes for marital
conflict in the Catholic-Protestant marriage." Id., at 403. "(T)he
chief source of friction centers about the religious training of the
children. Although the young couple agree before marriage that
the children will be baptized in the Catholic faith, they may find
they cannot follow through on this agreement in marriage." Id.,
at 404.
48 Baber, A Study of 325 Mixed Marriages, 2 Am. Sociol. Rev. 705 (1937).
49 Landis, op. cit. iupra note 41 at 405-406.
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the children in her own faith if she desires, only to discover that
he is greatly disturbed when such instruction begins. The extent to which early religious training may affect attitudes later
in life is frequently underestimated."5 0 On the other hand, some
agencies at least proceed on the assumption that a religiously
mixed marriage in which one of the partners has little or no religious interest is preferable to one in which both are actively
interested in their respective churches. Mgr. Bowers, for example,
speaking for the Catholic Church at the National Conference on
Adoption Workshop, noted that "(i) t is an unhappy commentary
on the ethos of our age that there is often more disunity when
the mixed marriage is between a Catholic and an active member
of a Protestant sect, than when the non-Catholic has little or no
religious conviction. Some Catholic agencies, through unfortunate
experience, have had to recognize this in their adoption requirements."51
Then there is the matter of comparative divorce and desertion rates in religiously mixed and unmixed marriages. In both
the Landis and Bell studies and in a study by Weeks in Washington approximately 5% of the Catholic and Jewish marriages ended
in divorce or separation as compared with 8% of the Protestant
marriages and 15% of the Catholic-Protestant marriages. 52 T. E.
Sullenger, in a study of Douglas County, Nebraska divorce court
records from 1922 to 1926 likewise concluded that the CatholicProtestant marriage was more fragile than the average.5 3 The
50 Baber, Religion and the Family, Annals of Am. Ac. of Pol. & Soc. Sc.

92, 94 (March, 1948).
51 Bowers, The Child's Heritage from a Catholic Point of View, in 2

Schapiro, op. cit. supra note 24 at 131. Bowers additionally comments
that "(t)he practice of Catholic adoption agencies in respect to applicants from a mixed marriage varies . . . In some dioceses Catholic
agencies will not entertain 'mixed marriage' applications, except in
rare instances; in other dioceses such applications will be considered,
particularly if the wife is the Catholic partner." Id., at 130.
2 All of these studies are reported in Landis, op. cit. supra note 41 at
403. See also, Pike, If You Marry Outside Your Faith, 27 et. seq.
(1954); Fishbein and Kennedy, Modern Marriage and Family Living,
65 et seq. (1957).
G3 Sullenger, A Study of Divorce and Its Causation in Douglas County,
Nebraska (2nd ed., Omaha, Municipal U. of Omaha) (1932). Sullenger's figures indicate that of all divorces between 1922 and 1926 in
which either or both parties were Catholic, 40 per cent were Catholic
mixed marriages. Since marriages of Catholics in the archdiocese
were only 20 per cent Catholic mixed, it would appear that such
mixed marriages were more fragile.
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Landis study, however, seems by far the most significant and, to
carry the findings a little further, it made a difference whether
the mother was Catholic or Protestant in the mixed marriage.
The divorce rate was highest of all where the mother was Protestant. 21% of such marriages ended in divorce as compared to 7%
of the marriages ending in divorce
where a Protestant man was
4
married to a Catholic woman.5
However, not all of the sociological research is in accord with
the above findings. Monahan and Kephart, for example, after
an intensive survey of Philadelphia court records concerning desertion and non-support cases from 1915 through 1950 found that
mixed religious marriages "do not appear to any greater degree than
expected."5 5 On the contrary, it was found that unmixed Catholic
marriages, with reference to their proportion in the population,
were overrepresented by nearly 40%, that the Jewish group was
under-represented to about the same degree and that the white
Protestant class was about 25% underrepresented. 6 Such findings do not, of course, and are not intended to lead anywhere
but only to remind the reader of the dangers involved in jumping from statistical generalizations about mixed marriages to generalizations about what should constitute acceptable practice in
the area of adoption.
One final piece of data. There is some sociological evidence
that lack of interest in religion is associated with denominationally
mixed marriages. Lenski's 1941 survey of 860 randomly selected
white families in Indianapolis showed that such marriages exhibited "little" interest in religion in 33.1% of the cases whereas
in unmixed marriages only 20.8% expressed "little" interest in
religion. 57 The corresponding percentages for couples exhibiting
"much" interest in religion are nearly reversed.

B. JUDIcIAL CASELAW
So much for the sociological framework. What about the
courts? Unfortunately, not a single case has been uncovered
which discusses the religiously mixed marriage in an adoption
context. Indeed, we are not even told whether in states with
54 Landis, op. cit. supra note 41 at 403.
55 Monahan and Kephart, Divorce and Desertion by Religious and MixedReligious Groups, 59 Am. J. of Sociol. 454, 461 (1954).
56 Id., at 462.
57 Lenski, Social Correlates of Religious Interest, 18 Am. Sociol. Rev. 533,
543 (1953). Lenski's findings are commented upon in Reuss, op. cit.
supra note 11 at 223.
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religious protection statutes the factor of mixed marriage would
bar an adoption. Presumably however it would do so for in the
typical case there would by definition always be a conflict between the child's religion (or that of his natural mother) and the
religion of one of the adoptive applicants. Loosely relevant caselaw however is available from custody and guardianship areas
where the courts have sometimes been faced with requests either
that the child be reared in two different religions or that he be
entrusted to persons of one basic faith with directions to rear
him in a different basic faith. The cases typically arise out of
a divorce court where the parents differ over religion and each
wants custody or where one or both of the parents dies and
persons of the child's faith and of a differing faith contest guardianship or custody. Granting either type of request, it is apparent,
is ordinarily pregnant with psychological danger for the child and
potentially carries with it as much and probably far more harm
than would be involved in the typical adoption by a couple of
mixed religions.
Nevertheless, the courts have sometimes sustained such requests. In Commonwealth ex rel. Stack v. Stack,5 8 for example,
the Pennsylvania Court approved an arrangement whereby the
divorced wife, a Protestant, was required to raise the children
in the Catholic faith of her ex-husband, the children's father,
though she was permitted to and did in fact also take the children
to Protestant Sunday School following Mass every Sunday. And
a New York Court, in In re Lamb's Estate,59 while refusing custody
See also Martin v. Martin, 308
N.Y. 136, 123 N.E.2d 813 (1954) where the record shows that the child,
while required by court decree to attend Catholic parochial school,
likewise attended Christian Science services and instruction.
50 139 N.Y.Supp. 685 (1912). In re Mancini, 89 Misc. 83, 151 N.Y.Supp.
387 (1915) also bears mention. This involved a petition by a child of
14 to have a Protestant minister and his wife appointed as her guardians. The child had been living with and supported by the minister
for years and had been raised as a Presbyterian. Letters of guardianship were opposed by the child's eldest brother, a Catholic, on the
ground that the child's parents were Catholic and that the child had
accordingly to be raised Catholic. Though the brother admitted that
he was unable to support the child should the letters be denied, the
Court nevertheless agreed to the extent that the letters were granted
on condition that the child's religion be changed from Presbyterian
to Catholic and that she be placed by the minister in a Catholic residential educational institution. See also, In re Cross' Guardianship,
92 Misc. 89, 155 N.Y.Supp. 1020 (1915) (custody of child conditioned on
raising child in faith basically different from that of custodian); Commonwealth ex rel. Boschert v. Cook, 122 Pa.Sup. 397, 186 AtL 221
(1936) (same).
58 141 Pa. Super. 147, 15 Atl.2d 76 (1940).
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to a Catholic father because he was unfit, gave the child to a
devout Protestant maternal aunt on condition that the child be
raised a Catholic to insure which the Court appointed a Catholic
"religious co-guardian." The previously-discussed Nebraska case
of Lemke v. Gutman0 O is also noteworthy though involving as
does Lamb's Estate the question of the natural parent's right to
dictate the religion of his child. Lemke, it will be recalled, was
a custody fight over a nine year old child between a Catholic
maternal aunt who had been raising the child as a Catholic and
a Lutheran father. Custody was awarded to the aunt but only
on condition that the child be raised as a Lutheran.
On the other hand, in order to protect the child from confusion, some courts have strongly frowned on such dual or divided
religious instruction arrangements. The California Court, for example, in In re Guardianshipof Walsh,"' recently ruled that custody of a child should not be divided between Catholic and
Protestant grandparents but that the entire religious training
should be in one faith or another and the Court for reasons unconnected with preference for either religion chose the Catholic
2
faith. A recent Iowa case, Lynch v. Uhlenhopp," is also entitled
provided, purwhich
decree
divorce
to mention. This involved a
have custody
should
wife
Protestant
the
that
stipulation,
suant to
of one child on condition that the child be raised "in the Roman
Catholic Religion," the religion of her ex-husband, the child's
father. When the wife failed to comply and in fact took the child
to a Congregationalist Church contempt proceedings were brought
and she was found guilty in the District Court. On appeal, however, the judgment was reversed. The provision in the decree,
the Court said, was "to indefinite" to enforce. Actually, of. course,
it was not; the Court was simply against such provisions and
strongly felt that the religious training of the child should, in
order to avoid upsetting the child, follow the custody award. Significantly also the opinion was in part rested on constitutional
grounds: Requiring by judicial decree that a child be raised in
behalf of religion in violaa particular faith was state action on
63
tion of the Fourteenth Amendment.

60 105 Neb. 251, 181 N.W. 132 (1920).
61 114 Cal.App.2d 82, 249 P.2d 578 (1952).
62

248 Iowa 68, 78 N.W.2d 491 (1956), noted 42 Iowa L. Rev. 617 (1957).

03

Id., at 82 and 500.
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C.

AGENCY AND JUDIcIAL CONCERN IN NEBRASKA ADOPTION CASES

It will be recalled that two situations were studied, both
involving infants. The first case supposes adoptive parents with
different basic faiths with each parent regularly attending his
own church. How do Nebraska adoption agencies view such a
situation? The finding could hardly be more clear. Unless one
of the adoptive parents is a Catholic, couples whose basic faiths
are diffdrent stand a very poor chance in Nebraska of securing
a child through an agency. Three of Nebraska's seven major
agencies, representing 52% of all annual agency adoptions, regard the situation as creating an automatic bar to placement.
A fourth agency, handling 3% of the cases, views it as extremely
unfavorable to placement and has sometimes refused placements
on this ground while a fifth agency, the State, handling 18% of
the cases, regards it unfavorably but not extremely so. The two
Catholic agencies, however, handling 25% of the cases, have no
objection whatever to making a placement with a couple whose
basic faiths are different provided only that one of the parents
is a Catholic in good standing. This, it will be recalled, is consistent with the position of the Catholic agencies when asked
about placing a child with previous religious training with parents
one of which had the same faith as that in which the child had
received training.
The judges, while again proving much less concerned with
religious problems than the agencies, were nevertheless sharply
divided in their reactions. In interpreting the figures, however,
it must be remembered that a large percentage of the judges, in
contrast to the agencies, do not make the inquiries which would
apprise them that a couple of basically different faiths is even
before them. Thus in cases involving infants, for example, 42%
of the judges never inquire concerning the names of the adoptive parents' basic faiths and another 13% do so only occasionally.
With this in mind, then, the figures are as follows. Two percent
of the judges would automatically bar the adoption, 44% regard
it as a factor extremely unfavorable (17%) or unfavorable (27%)
to the adoption while 17% thought it was only slightly unfavorable. Thirty-seven percent, on the other hand, said that it would
have no effect upon them one way or another.
In the second case the adoptive parents are both Protestants
but belong to different denominations and regularly attend their
own respective churches. So far as the agencies were concerned,
this was exactly the same as where the adoptive parents had
different basic faiths. Their responses in the two situations were
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identical except that the Catholic agencies noted that they do
not handle Protestant children and so had to be excluded. Perhaps the identity of the responses is in part explained because
both parents in the two cases regularly attend their own churches.
The judges, on the other hand, thought that the two cases were
quite different. No judge would automatically bar an interProtestant type adoption and only 14% thought the situation to
be either extremely unfavorable (2%) or unfavorable (12%).
Eighty-seven percent of the judges said that it would either have
no effect upon them (50%) or only a slightly unfavorable effect

(31%).
IV. CHURCH MEMBERSHIP AND ATTENDANCE
A.

TnE VIEw OF TrE CHURcH

This portion of the study asks about the importance attached
by Nebraska's adoption agencies and judges to such matters as
the adoptive parents' church memberships, the regularity of their
attendance at church and whether they intend to see that the
child attends Sunday school and church. Such inquiries, and
they are of course made, do more than just touch lightly upon
the problem of separation of church and state and raise policy
questions of the most difficult character. The basic assumption
of the inquiries, of course, is that participation in organized religion is essential to a good home and to the good life or at least
helps make for them. But the assumption has not gone unchallenged and indeed has been a major point of controversy in adoption practice literature. 64 The controversy, furthermore, has been
intense, sometimes bitter and has involved churchmen and laymen alike. Spokesmen for the three basic faiths in the United
States appear markedly to differ on the question. Added perspective is perhaps gained from brief excerpts of the Catholic,
Protestant and Jewish positions as stated at the 1955 Conference

64

At the 1955 National Conference on Adoption, for example, "(t)here
was . . . no agreement on the desirability of formalized religion in the
adoptive home. Opinion here probably reflects a cross-section of opinion in the United States. It varied from those who believed that no
home could be adequate for the nurture of a child unless parents were
devoutly religious, to those who believed that ethical, moral parents,
though they observed no formal religion, could provide a desirable
home for a child." 1 Schapiro, op. cit. supra note 2 at 59. See also,
Adoption Practices and Problems, Child Welfare League of America
35 (1952).
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on Adoption of the Child Welfare League of America. The Catholic position was set forth by Mgr. Bowers: 65
There are certain minimal religious requirements, and so far
as these are concerned there can be no question of their relativity
in relation to other factors. They can be stated in terms of what
the Church minimally demands in practice of its members, regular
attendance at Mass on Sundays and Holydays, reception of the
Sacraments during the Easter season, no flagrant and continuing
violations of the moral law in grave matters. These are a conditio
sine qua non; if they are not present the applicants cannot be
considered suitable adoptive parents, no matter what other inducements they may offer. More than a religious minimum will
usually be required.
The Protestant statement was by Reverand Chakerian: 66
(The child's) healthy and all-around development depends
in no small measure on the religious situation in the home in
which he is being raised. This is so because religion is the main
source of ideals, of spiritual and ethical values, of belief regarding
one's relationship to God, and of attitudes and practices toward
one's fellow men ....
If religion is important in the life of a child, then the religious
values and practices of an adoptive home must be assessed. It is
not sufficient to find out whether a prospective parent is a Congregationalist, a Methodist, or a Baptist. It is more necessary and
of much more value to discover the extent to which the individual's
life is guided by his religious beliefs. Church membership, church
attendance, observance of religious customs, religious education
in the home, the relation of professed religious beliefs to daily
practices are some of the items that need to be included in the
investigation of prospective adoptive parents.

Rabbi
Duker, speaking for the Jewish faith, took a different
07
view:
The proposal has been made that children be given for adoption to families that are affiliated with religious bodies or practice the religious rites and life as prescribed by the individual
denominations. I know. quite a few highly moral and ethical
persons who are not religious affiliated ... I am nevertheless
convinced that such persons can be good adoptive parents . . . I

also ask myself some questions which I would like to place before
this gathering: Who are we to decide that persons who cannot
become parents by an act of God should be deprived of the joy
of adoptive paternity because of religious requirements or should
be forced to lie or pretend .

.

. in order to obtain

the child?

Should adoptive parents be forced to submit to a continuous
105 Bowers, op cit. supra note 51 at 132-133.
66 Chakerian, The Religious Component in Adoption: A Protestant Appraisal, in 2 Schapiro, op. cit. supra note 24 at 128.
67 Duker, Jewish Attitudes to Child Adoption, in Schapiro, op. cit. supra
note 24.at 148-149.
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process of religious testing to see whether the home is sufficiently
religious? ... How do we assess the religious content of a home?
Come to think of it, some of our Founding Fathers who were deists
would not have been qualified for adoptive parenthood under
such conditions.
Carried to their logical conclusion, religious tests would involve continuous inspection of households by religious functionaries ... Shall clergymen of the various faiths become officially
part of the state adoption apparatus?... The implication for
social workers of such a wide permissiveness to religious factors
is ominous.
B.

RELIGION AND BEHAVIOR

What does available sociological evidence disclose concerning the relationship of religion to behavior and the good life?
One set of studies seeks to examine the correlation between exposure to religious instruction or actual possession of religious
information and good character traits such as honesty and selfcontrol. Doubtless the most significant such study is the Character Education Inquiry instituted by Hartshorne and May at
Columbia University Teacher's College in 1924.03 After exhaustive tests on hundreds of non-delinquent children the finding was
that the children's ability to form correct moral judgments, their
self-control, their persistence and their general honesty bore no
relation to their religious training or the lack of it and that in
some instances religious training was positively associated with
dishonesty. A somewhat similar study by Hightower at Iowa
State in 1930, based on 435 randomly selected delinquents and nondelinquents likewise showed no correlation between religious training and behavior. 69 The idea here, as in some of the Hartshorne
and May studies, was to test the amount of cheating on tests and
it was found that children exposed to religious instruction cheated
as much and in some cases more than did those without such
training. Similar studies by Franzblau 76 in 1930, Harlow in 194871
and Diaz 72 in 1954 yielded comparable results. The Diaz study
6s Hartshorne and May, Studies in Deceit (1930).
69 Hightower, Biblical Information in Relation to Character and Conduct,
in Starbuck, 3 University of Iowa studies in Character (no. 2) (1930).
70 Franzblau, Religious Belief and Character Among Jewish Adolescents
(1930).
71 Harlow, Biblical Knowledge and Ideals of Verbal Honesty (1948).
72 Diaz, A Study of the Ability of Eleventh-Grade Girls to Apply the
Principles of the Moral Law to Actual and Hypothetical Life Situations
(Ph.D., Fordham, 1952), noted in 49 Religious Education 181 (June,
1954). See also, Dominic, Religion and the Juvenile Delinquent, 1954
Am. Cath. Sociol. Rev. 256.
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was based on 915 Catholic girls in the 11th grade, divided into
two groups, 500 girls enrolled in the New York diosecan school
for girls and 415 girls enrolled in New York and New Jersey
Public schools. Religious training within each group, it was found,
had no relation to behavior, either hypothetical or actual. Some
minor studies, 7 3 including two conducted in Nebraska, to some
degree tend to look in the opposite direction but it is conceded
by everyone that any significant degree of correlation between
religious training and morality has yet to be demonstrated. Indeed, the weight of the evidence, such as it is and so far as
studies of this type are concerned, lies the other way.
There is also the question of the relationship if any between
delinquent or criminal behavior and lack of religion. Such a relationship, of course, is very commonly assumed or asserted, so
much so in fact and so often by one national figure that statements
to this effect have become identified as J. Edgar Hooverisms. 7 4 Actually however no correlation has ever been shown
between delinquency and crime and lack of religion and the few
studies sometimes relied upon as evidence of a connection consist merely of a showing that a large percentage of delinquents
come from homes in which religious training is absent or nearly
The lack of religious training factor, however, has never been
held constant and the connection in question is probably explained
by other factors. In addition, some studies, similarly inconclusive
and lacking in rigor, point in the opposite direction. A study of
761 delinquents referred to the Passaic Children's Bureau during the period 1939-1944,76 for example, disclosed that 92.2% of
73

Sctnepp and Johnson, Do Religious Background Factors Have Predictive Value, 14 Marr. & Faro. Living 301 (Nov., 1952); Maehr, The Re-

lationship of Bible Information to Certain Specific Beliefs and Practices (Ph.D. Nebraska, 1955); Turner, Effectiveness of Religious Education in Developing Honesty in a Classroom Situation, (M.A. Nebraska,
1947). The Maehr dissertation briefly reviews all of the literature in
the area.
74 See, e.g., Hager, Race, Nationality and Religion, op. cit. supra note 7
at 132: "It will require more than the prestige of J. Edgar Hoover
and the convictions that flow from popular religious sentiment to
transform an assertion into valid theory."
75 E.g., Mihanovich, Principles of Juvenile Delinquency 19 (1950); The
Delinquent Child, (White House Conference) 143 (1932); Cooley, Pro-

bation and Delinquency 71 (1927).
76 Kvaraceus, Delinquent Behavior and Church Attendance, 28 Sociology

and Soc. Research 284 (1944).
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the delinquents on whom data was available claimed membership in some church as compared to 56.7% church membership
for the community as a whole. The percentage of delinquents
regularly attending church, 54.2%, was likewise doubtless in excess of average citizen attendance. Again, "there is considerable
evidence indicating that known criminals do not differ significantly from the general population with respect to (at least) nominal religious affiliation. In fact, were we to rely upon statistics
alone we would have to admit that prison inmates made by far
the better showing . . . Dunn found that 19,882 or 77.3 per cent,
out of a total of 25,726 inmates of 27 state penitentiaries, claimed
affiliation with either the Protestant or Roman Catholic faith.
Another survey, by F. Steinder, showed that of 85,000 convicts,
some 68,000 or 80 per cent, termed themselves nominal Christians.
The number of avowed unbelievers amounted to but a small fraction of 1 per cent ... (T) here is little or no reason to believe that
convicts are peculiarly antagonistic to conventional religion, as com17
pared with the nonprison population. 7
C.

RELIGION AND MARRIAGE

More useful in the present connection perhaps are the marriage
satisfaction studies and the divorce anddesertion rates of religiously interested as compared with non-religious persons. The monumental study by Burgess of 526 young middle-class married couples
in Chicago and suburbs is particularly noteworthy.7s Burgess
found that in the case of both bride and groom "those reporting
no church connections ranked lower than the average in 'good'
adjustment, constituting only 33.7 per cent and 39.6 per cent, respectively, of the well adjusted." 79 Attendance at church and
Sunday school was even more closely associated with marital
happiness. "Both husbands and wives who never went to Sunday
school or who stopped going after 10 years of age show (ed) a
markedly lower proportion of highly successful and a higher proportion of unsuccessful marriages as measured by the adjustment
score. On the other hand, those who continued going to Sunday
school until they were 19 to 25 years old, or even older . . . (had)
a distinctly higher chance than other groups for marital success
77

Smith, Organized Religion and Criminal Behavior, 33 Sociology and
Soc. Research 362, 364-365 (1949).

78

Burgess, Predicting Success or Failure in Marriage (1939). See also,
Burgess and Wallin, Engagement and Marriage (1953); and Burgess,

79

Burgess, op. cit. supra note 78 at 123.

Wallin and Schultz, Courtship, Engagement and Marriage (1954).
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and a lower chance for failure."8 0 Attendance at church was
particularly important in the case of husbands. The husbands
who never attended church were the "'poorest' matrimonial risks,
those who attend (ed) once or less a month 'average,' and those
who attend(ed) two, three or four times a month the 'best'." '
On the other hand, Terman's study of 792 upper-middle and middle
class married couples in California showed that the happiest marriage was one in which the couple had only a medium amount of
religious training as compared with little or none or much.8 2 However, neither the Burgess or the Terman findings approached
statistical significance though Terman's came very close. Insofar
as divorce and separation rates are concerned, all known studies
are agreed that persons with little or no religious interest head
the list.8 3

D. PERCENTAGE OF POPULATION RELIGIOUSLY INTERESTED
One final cluster of data. It is relevant to inquire about the
general social attitudes of religiously interested persons and their
number in relation to our population as a whole. Most studies at
least show them to be more conservative than average and less
tolerant of non-conformist attitudes and behavior.84 Stouffer's
80 Id., at 123-124.
81 Id., at 124.
.2 Terman, Psychological Factors in Marital Adjustment 234-35 (1938).
However, because Terman felt that the matter of religious training
was perhaps accounted for by other items in his marriage prediction
scale and because of the slight correlation between 'considerable'
(rather than very much or very little) religion in childhood and marriage success and failure, the item was omitted from his marriage
prediction scale.
83 Landis, e.g., op. cit. supra note 41 at 403 notes that in all major studies
approximately 5 per cent of the Catholic and Jewish marriages, 8 per
cent of the Protestant marriages, 15 per cent of the mixed CatholicProtestant marriages and 18 per cent of the marriages in which there
was no religious faith end either in separation or divorce. So far as
his own study was concerned, Landis further found that "when a

Catholic woman marries a man who has no religious faith the divorce

rate is relatively low-.01 per 100--when compared with other types
of mixed marriage. However, when the Proestant woman marries a
man with no religion, the divorce rate was higher, 10 per 100." Ibid.
34 The point that religiously-interested persons are less tolerant of nonconformism than the average citizen takes on added significance in
the light of such public opinion polls as those showing that in May,
1953, 42 per cent of the nation felt that "In peacetime, newspapers
should not be allowed to criticize our form of government," with an
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famous study of attitudes towards civil liberties, based on a national sample of 4,933 persons, is illustrative."5
Stouffer found
that of the "3095 persons attending church in the month prior to
interviewing, only 28% were classified as 'more tolerant' whereas
36% of the 1833 persons who did not attend church during that
period were so classified. Furthermore, only two of the items
used in the tolerance scale directly involve enemies of churches
and religion.... There would appear to be something about
people who go to church regularly that makes fewer of them, as
compared with non-churchgoers, willing to accord civil rights to
non-conformists who might be Communists, suspected Communists,
or merely Socialists. 6 On the other hand, one or two minor
stjudies find no correlation between conformism and interest in
87
religion.
Now, what degree of interest do we as a population exhibit
in religion? Approximately 49% of us belong to a church but
doubtless many of our affiliations are little more than nominal8 8
Using the latest available national sample figures and taking our

additional 4 per cent unable to make up their minds; that in May,
1953, 39 per cent of the general public were against allowing socialists
to publish newspapers in peacetime, with another 15 per cent unable
to decide; and that in January, 1951, 34 per cent of the population
were against allowing newspapers to take sides in editorials around
election time with an additional 8 per cent unable to decide. See
Hyman and Sheatsley, Trends in Public Opinion on Civil Liberties,
9 J. of Social Issues (No. 3) 6, 15-16 (1953).
85 Stouffer, Communism Conformity, and Civil Liberties (1955).
86 Id., at 143. See also, Yinger, Religion in the Struggle for Power, 155
et seq. (1946); Angel, Integration of American Society 164 (1941);
Trott and Sanderson, What Church People Think about Social and
Economic Issues (1938).
87 Lantz, Religious Participation and Social Orientation of 1,000 University Students, 33 Sociology and Soc. Research 285 (1949) (no correlation found between attitudes on social conditions between church
and non-church goers among 1,000 Ohio State college students); and
see Coleman, Social Clevage and Religious Conflict, 12 J. of Social
Issues (No. 3) 44, 52-53 (1956); Social Economic Status and Outlook of
Religious Groups in America, 27 Information Service of Department
of Research and Education, Federal Council of the Churches of Christ
in America 6 et seq. (May 15, 1948).
88 According to a recent survey, there are 74,125,462 church members in
the United States, including 39,310,840 Protestants, 29,688,058 Roman
Catholics and 5,112,024 Jews. Using 1950 census figures as a basis
(150,697,361 total population) this means that 49.1% of us belong to
a church. The respective percentages of the total population for the
three major faiths are Protestants 26.0%, Roman Catholics 19.7% and
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own statements in all cases as true, 36 per cent of us, mostly women,
went to church last Sunday while 64% of us did not.s9 Indeed,
42% of us have not attended church in the past month and another
11% attended only once. 90 Only 19% of us attended each week
during the past month and most who attended were Catholics.9 1
On the other hand, 61% of us according to ourselves send our
92
children to Sunday school regularly while 39% of us do not.
And we are, it appears, much more likely to insist that our girls
attend than our boys. 93 The pattern thus revealed has probably
always held true. "Never in the religious history of the United
States is there much evidence to show that more than about
one-third of the population ever went regularly to any place of
and sometimes the proportion has been probably much
worship,
94
less."

Jews .03%.

Churches and Church Membership in the United States,

Bureau of Research and Survey, Series A, No. 2, National Council of
the Churches of Christ in the U.S.A. (1956).
Church membership in Nebraska is slightly above the 49.1% national average. A 1958 survey gives us 707,954 church members out
of a 1950 total population of 1,325,510 or 53.4% of the total. 37.2% of
the total population are Protestant church members (493,597), 15.5%
belong to the Roman Catholic Church (206,907) and .06% are Jewish
Churches and Church Membership in the United
affiliated (7,450).
States, Bureau of Research and Survey, Series E, No. 2, National
Council of the Churches of Christ in the U.S.A. (1958).
s9 Cantril, Public Opinion 1935-1946, at 700 (1951) (based on national
sample in November, 1944).
90 Ibid.
91 Ibid.
92

Ibid.

93 Thus of a national sample of high school students in February, 1939,

63.5 per cent of the girls said that they attended church weekly or
more often as compared with 49.6 per cent of the boys. Ibid. Data
elsewhere uniformly show that women exhibit a much more marked
interest in religion than do men. See, e.g., Bultena, Church Membership and Church Attendance in Madison, Wisconsin, 14 Am. Soc. Rev.
384 (1949). The Bultena study showed that while there was very little
difference in Madison, Wisconsin between the average attendance of
the Catholic men (3.47 times per month) and that of the Catholic
women (3.54), there was a larger difference between the respective
attendance of Protestant men (1.66) and Protestant women (1.99).
See also, Stouffer, op. cit. supra note 85 at 141.
94

Hall, Religious Background of American Culture, quoted in Bultena,
op. cit. supra note 93 at 388. See also, Landis, The Church and Religious Activity, Am. J. of Sociol. 783 (1935): Anders, Religious Behavior of Church Families, 17 Marr. & Fain. Liv. 54 (Feb., 1955).
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Be this as it may, the bulk of the cases, the vast majority
of them involving custody and guardianship questions, indicate
that church membership, church attendance and parental insistence on Sunday school or other formalized religious instruction
for the child are important if not vital ingredients in determining what is in the "best interest of the child."9
Indeed, there
are even cases where religion is virtually the only element relied upon to show good character" 6 and some courts have gone
to the extent of withholding consent to custody or adoption until
an applicant, temporarily in difficulty with his church, is able
to regain good standing.9 7 A few courts, to be sure, profess not
95 E.g., In re Waite, 190 Iowa 182, 180 N.W. 149 (1920) (church members);

96

97

Walen v. Boles, 314 Ky. 817, 326 S.W.2d 885 (1951) (regular church
attenders); Wheeler v. Wheeler, 249 Ala. 119, 29 So.2d 881 (1947) (home
located near church); Hewitt v. Morgan, 220 Ark. 123, 246 S.W.2d 423
(1952) (good substantial Christian people); Bourn v. Hinsey, 134 F1.2d
404, 183 So. 614 (1937) (religious home); Crowe v. Crowe, 116 Ind. App.
534, 65 N.E.2d 645 (1946) (Christian home); Vanover v. Hunby, 309
Ky. 461, 218 S.W.2d 20 (1949) (child regularly sent to Sunday school
and sometimes to church); Commonwealth ex rel. Batturs v. Batturs,
162 Pa. Sup. 573, 60 A.2d 610 (1948) (same); Commonwealth ex rel.
Kreiling v. Kreiling, 156 Pa. Super. 526, 40 A.2d 704 (1945) (same);
Wellcome v. Wilk, 339 Ill. App. 444, 90 N.E.2d 260 (1950) (same).
Only occasionally does one encounter a judicial suggestion that
church membership and attendance are not necessarily indicative of
good parentship and then only in cases involving natural parents.
One such is Hewit v. Long, 76 II. 399 (1875): "All that can be determined about her from the evidence, is . . .that she is a woman
who attends church, teaches in a Sabbath school, and plays upon a
piano and organ .... It is unnecessary to say, that a woman may
attend church, may teach in a Sabbath school . . . and yet be wholly
unfit to be the mistress over a girl." Id., at 402.
The value of Sunday school training has similarly gone unchallenged though at least two courts have refused to deprive a natural
mother of custody because she failed to send her child to Sunday
school. In both cases it was said or inferred that moral training at
home would do as well. Rone v. tone, 20 S.W.2d 545 (Mo. App., 1929);
Fuller v. Fuller, 249 Mich. 19, 227 N.W. 541 (1929).
E.g., Mayfield v. Braund, 217 Miss. 514, 64 So.2d 713, suggestion of
error overruled, 65 So.2d 235 (1953). The person in question, a father,
had a prison record and apparently little else except his religion to
commend him.
People ex rel. McGrath v. Gimler, 60 N.Y.S.2d 622, aff'd, 270 App.
Div. 949, 62 N.Y.S.2d 846 (1946). The Court was here faced with a
foreign custody decree awarding custody to the father. Recognizing
its own lack of jurisdiction, the court nevertheless refused to order
the child placed in petitioner's custody until he had again established
himself as a Catholic in good standing. And see In re Korte, 78 Misc.
276, 139 N.Y.Supp. 444 (1912).
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to be concerned with such matters and insist, generally on constitutional grounds, that tests of comparative devoutness and
church going cannot be usedY8 But such cases are unusual. The
general picture is one of intense judicial interest in church membership and regular church attendance and in custody cases of
balancing one set of contestant's religiosity against another's.9 9
The Nebraska cases reflect the general pattern. In In re Guardianship of Herter,0 0 for example, the Court noted "the fine religious home" of the prevailing contestant and the winning contestants in Kaufman v. Kaufman'0 ' were such in part because
they were "members and regular attendants of a church, and
intend (ed) to raise the child as a Christian." State ex Tel. Britt6n
v. Bryant'0 2 is similar. This was a habeas corpus action by a
mother to regain possession of her infant of grammer school
age from persons who had cared for it for a considerable time.
In affirming the order of the District Court granting relief the
Court pointedly commented on the fact that respondents had
"failed to send the child to . .. church and Sunday school" and
noted that since the lower court judgment "the child is happy
and contented and is regularly attending, school, church and Sunday school."
98 Jones v. Bowman, 13 Wyo. 79, 77 Pac. 439 (1904); Describes v. Wilmer,
69 Ala. 25 (1881); Maxey v. Bell, 41 Ga. 184 (1870). The most definitive pronouncement however, is found in Kendall v. Williams, 233 S.W.
196, 197 (Tex. Civ. App., 1921): "The proof discloses that . . . all of
the appellants are devout Christians, while Wester Williams is not
a member of the church, although his wife belongs... It also appears that appellees attend religious services only at infrequent times.
... On the other hand, the proof . . . (as to appellants) is that they
give zealous adherence to all ... the church activities .... From
these circumstances appellants argue that the finding of the trial court
are contrary to the proof . . . The sentiments embodied in appellants'
argument . . .are well calculated to weigh heavily ... (b)ut whatever religious ... belief dominates the individual hearts of those
who . . .administer the judiciary, their allegiance to judicial functions
requires that their judgments conform alone to the rules of law and
fundamental justice . . .The test of comparative extent of devoutness
cannot be substituted for . .. (legal standards). A Court of law is
not a place in which to ascertain and declare religious orthodoxy,
and derive from it the rights and welfare of people in the ordinary
relations of life."
99 See cases cited note 95 supra.
'"" 127 Neb. 88, 254 N.W. 698 (1934); see also, In re Burdick, 91 Neb. 639,
136 N.W. 988 (1912).
101 140 Neb. 299, 299 N.W. 617 (1941).
11)2 95 Neb. 129, 145 N.W. 266 (1914).
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AGENCY AND JuDIciAL CONCERN IN NEBRASKA ADOPTION CASES

It has been a lengthy prelude, perhaps too lengthy and the
data were not always altogether unequivocal. Let us now turn
to agency and county judge practice in Nebraska. Several cases
were studied: 1) neither adoptive parent is a church member;
2) the mother belongs but the father does not; 3) the father
belongs but the mother does not; 4) both belong but they seldom
attend; 5) both belong and one regularly attends while the other
seldom attends; and 6) both are deeply religious but neither believes in nor practices an organized religion. The general nature
of the findings is readily predictable. The agencies on the whole
were rigorously insistent upon church connections while the judges
or at least many of them were not. There is also the usual caveat
in connection with the judges. Many of them simply do not ask
the questions which would apprise them of the existence of the
various situations. Here, however, they were more than usually
curious though more so about church membership than church
attendance. 56% of the judges make it a practice always (31%)
or generally (25%) to inquire concerning petitioners' church memberships as compared with 46% always (14%) or generally (32%)
inquiring about regularity of church attendance. On the other
hand, 43% of the judges only occasionally (10%) or never (33%)
ask about church membership, with 54% seldom (12%) or never
(42%) inquiring about regularity of attendance at church. The
number of judges inquiring about these matters, incidentally, is
approximately the same whether infants or children with previous religious training are involved.
One final point about inquiries. In cases involving infants
66% of the judges never (58%) or seldom (8%) specifically inquire whether the infant will receive formal religious training
if the petition is granted, with 14% always and 20% generally
inquiring. The situation is somewhat different where children
old enough to have received religious training are involved. Here
53% never (38%) or seldom (15%) inquire as compared with
48% always (30%) or generally (18%) inquiring. As would be
expected, the adoption agencies uniformly make all inquiries
necessary to learn of the various situations, either in the application for adoption or through personal interviews and investigations.
Where neither adoptive parent is a church member, five of
the State's seven major agencies, representing 52% of all agency
adoptions for 1957, would automatically refuse placement and several indicated that they had sometimes done so on account of
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this factor. The two major remaining agencies, representing 47%
of all adoptions, would doubtless also do so as a practical matter.
Both noted their extreme disapproval. Nor was it much different for the agencies when one of the applicants belonged. Furthermore, the agencies did not distinguish between the case where
the mother belonged and the father did not and the case where
the membership situation was reversed. The cases were uniformly
viewed as identical.10 3 When either the father or the mother
did not belong, three of the seven agencies, handling 27% of the
cases, would still automatically bar the placement, a fourth agency,
the State of Nebraska, viewed it as extremely unfavorable while
the remaining three agencies check the "unfavorable" category.
In view of the large number of applicants for adoption in relation to the number of available children probably every major
adoption agency in the State must be regarded as closed to any
couple both of whom do not belong to a church. With 47% of
the state's population not belonging, this is a considerable exclusion.
The judges as a whole likewise attached considerable importance to church membership though by no means as much as did
the agencies. Where neither adoptive parent belongs 2% of the
judges would automatically bar the petition, 52% viewed the
situation either as extremely unfavorable (19%) or unfavorable
(33%) with 47% checking "only slightly unfavorable" (19%) or
"no effect" (28%). The percentage of judges in the "no effect"
category, it will be noted, is exceeded by only one other percentage, the "unfavorable," and then only slightly. Here again
is evidence of a solid nucleus of judges attaching no importance
whatever to religious factors. And we likewise encounter once
more the approximately 20% of the judges attaching controlling
importance to such matters.
The judges, unlike most of the agencies, thought the situation quite different where one of the parents belonged and furthermore, and even more unlike the agencies, drew some distinc103

If the object of agency insistence on membership of both parents is to
ensure greater participation in church activities for the family as a
whole their position would seem to be supported by what little available sociological evidence there is. Anders' study of 417 Protestant
church families in a small urban community in Florida indicated that
"(f)amilies in which one spouse was not a member of a church had a
mean participation score . . . considerably lower than the mean score
for the church membership . . . (and that) greater over-all family
participation seemed to demand that the father husband have some
church affiliation.". Anders, op. cit. supra note 94 at 56.
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tions between the case where the mother belongs and the father
does not and where the opposite membership situation prevails.
Where the mother belongs and the father does not no judge
would automatically bar the adoption, only 25% were extremely
unfavorable (7%) or unfavorable (18%) while 76% said "only
slightly unfavorable" (37%) or "no effect" (39%). Where however the father belongs but the mother does not 37% were in the
extremely unfavorable (9%) or unfavorable (28%) categories
with 63% marking "only slightly unfavorable" (28%) or "no effect" (35%).
As previously noted both the agencies and judges were less
affected by non-church going than by lack of church membership
though the agencies were still very much affected. Where neither
parent regularly attends, two Protestant agencies, handling 24%
of the cases, would automatically refuse placement though one
indicated that the situation would only be unfavorable if it was
impossible to regularly attend because of the location of the church
in relation to the parent's residence. The other would apparently
do so regardless of the circumstances. Three other agencies, representing 53% of the cases, viewed the situation as extremely unfavorable while the two remaining agencies, handling 22% of the
cases, regarded it unfavorably. If neither parent regularly attends probably the situation is about the same in terms of securing a child through an agency as where neither even belongs.
As a practical matter it is impossible in both cases. With onethird or less of us regularly attending church, it appears that the
agencies are excluding the bulk of the population.
Furthermore, it was not too different for the agencies where
one parent regularly attends and one seldom attends. Indeed,
one agency, though only handling 3% of the cases, thought that
this was worse than where neither regularly attends. Moving
from "unfavorable" to "extremely unfavorable" the notion perhaps was that one attending with the other not might perhaps
create a conflict situation for the child which would be worse
for him than where both parents spent their entire Sundays together. Of the remaining six agencies, two, handling 24% of the
cases, would automatically bar placement though one stated that
it might not do so if it was the husband who seldom attended
and his reason for not doing so was employment on Sundays.
Three other agencies, representing 53% of the cases, viewed the
situation as unfavorable while the sixth and last, handling 18%
of the cases, thought it was only slightly unfavorable. Again as
a practical matter both parents must probably regularly attend
church in order to secure a child from one of the agencies.
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So far as most of the judges were concerned regularity of
church attendance was not particularly important. Where neither
parent regularly attends no judge would automatically refuse his
consent and only 3% thought the situation to be extremely unfavorable. 28% on the other hand thought it unfavorable but
this is against 68% who thought it only slightly unfavorable
(34%) or said that it would have no effect (34%). The judges
were even less impressed when one parent regularly attended.
81% of them said that such a circumstance would either have no
effect upon them (45%) or only a slightly unfavorable effect
(36%). This compares with 19% in the unfavorable (16%) and
extremely unfavorable (3%) categories.
The final case, it will be recalled, postulates a deeply religious
couple with no interest in organized religion. The picture sought
to be created is that of a Bible reading, Sunday observing pair
who for one reason or another prefer to practice their religion
individually rather than with a group. How do the agencies and
judges view this? The agencies were strongly opposed. Five of
them, representing 77% of the agency cases, would without more
automatically bar such a couple while the remaining two, handling
22% of the cases, noted their extreme disapproval. The judges,
on the other hand, thought that the personal religiosity factor
improved the situation considerably over what it would have been
in the case of a non-church-belonging couple with no interest in
religion. 57% of the judges said that the situation would either
have no adverse effect upon them (35%) or only a slightly adverse effect (22%) as compared with 44% opposed (33%) or
extremely opposed (11%). No judge would automatically bar
a petition on this ground. However, several judges noting their
opposition to the situation commented that they had sometimes
in part refused to grant petitions on account of it. Several of the
agencies, it should be noted, likewise so stated.
V.

ATHEISTS AND AGNOSTICS

The final segment of the study concerns atheistic and agnostic applicants for adoption. As a practical matter, of course,
agency and judicial treatment of such persons in relation to adoption is unimportant. The positive unbeliever and the religious
skeptic constitute a very small portion of the population, approximately 4%,104 and, so far as many persons are concerned, prob104

A national sample in November, 1944 revealed that 96 per cent personally believed in a God, only 1 per cent did not and 3 per cent were
undecided. Cantril, Public Opinion 1935-1946, at 744 (1951).
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ably a much disliked segment. Perhaps atheists and agnostics do
not deserve separate treatment or any treatment at all; their
small minority and disliked status alone could bar their applications. Indeed, it appears that a large percentage of us are even
against permitting atheists the right of freedom of speech.10 5
At the same time, church and state are here supposed to be
kept separate and a man's right to disbelieve in religion is as
protected as his right to believe.
The question, furthermore, is interesting on account of its
history. Religious unbelievers and skeptics in the Western World
have traditionally had an extremely difficult time and it was not
long ago as history is measured that an English court deprived
the poet Shelley of the custody of his children because of his
avowed atheism.'0 6 Probably no American Court would follow the
07
precedent of that case today; certainly no English court would.
But adopting a child is not like being an atheist and having custody
of your own. Under religious protection statutes, of course, atheists and agnostics would normally have no standing to adopt since
all or almost all children are treated as possessing a faith and they
could not by definition match it.
No case involving an unbeliever or skeptic has yet arisen
under such a statute. Few have arisen outside. Illustrative of
their tenor, however, is In re Korte, 10 8 a New York case. This
involved a "free thinker's" application for the adoption of two
foundlings originally surrendered to him and his wife by a Roman
Catholic charity. The wife, a Catholic, had since died and the
Charity opposed the petitioner's application on the ground of his
lack of religion. Noting that "it would be a manifest wrong to
permit ...

(the) children to be brought up in a condition of

pagan unbelief and atheism," the Court denied the petition though
staying his order for six months so that petitioner could rethink
his convictions and place the children under Catholic teaching on

105 Thus in December, 1946 a national sample was asked: "An atheist is
a person who doesn't believe in God. In San Francisco, a radio
tion allowed an atheist to broadcast his views on religion. Would
approve or disapprove of letting atheists broadcast in this area?"
per cent disapproved, 8 per cent had no opinion and 36 per cent
proved. Id., at 713.
106 Shelley v. Westbrooke, Jac. 226, 37 Eng. Rep. 850 (1821).
107 See In re Blackburn, 41 App. 622, 632 (1890).
Compare In re McKenzie,
108 78 Misc. 276, 139 N.Y.Supp. 444 (1912).
Minn. 234, 266 N.W. 746 (1936).
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a trial basis. And there are other such cases.1 0 9 Also pertinent
is the large stream of precedent on the importance of church membership, church attendance and Sunday school.
On the other hand, as noted previously, a few cases look the
other way. In Maxey v. Bell," 0 for example, objection was raised
to a deceased father's appointment by will of a non-believer as
the guardian of his two children, aged 13 and 11. The objection
was summarily overruled on constitutional grounds. "(A) man
may think as he pleases upon any subject, religious, philosophical
or political, and is not, for that, under any civil or political disability." Likewise pertinent is the Alabama Court's approach to
a guardianship question in Desribes v. Wilmer:"' "(W)e feel it
our duty to dissever the contention from all supposed sectarian
bearings." But these are old cases; modern authority leans heavily
the other way. Except for the cases previously mentioned there
is no Nebraska authority in point.
In the present connection the questionnaire posed two cases
each relating to infants and to children old enough to have received religious training: 1)neither adoptive parent believes in
God; and 2) one adoptive parent believes in God while the other
does not. The questions relating to children old enough to have
received religious training assume that the children have in fact
received some. While due to oversight the questions as stated on
the questionnaire were framed solely in terms of atheists, the
answers of the agencies are equally applicable to agnostics. This
was determined by personal interviews. Whether the judges
would distinguish between atheists and agnostics is unfortunately
not known.
All seven of Nebraska's major adoption agencies would automatically refuse placement where both adoptive parents have no
belief in God and no distinction is drawn by them between cases
involving infants and those involving children old enough to have
received religious training. Nor is it much different for the agencies where only one adoptive parent does not believe. In cases
109 E.g., Eaton v. Eaton, N. J. Court of Chancery, January 27, 1936, N. Y.
Times, January 30, 1936, p. 1, noted in 49 Harv. L. Rev. 831 (1936);
aff'd on other grounds, 122 N.J.Eq. 142, 191 Atl. 839 (1937). And see
Ex Parte Agnello, 76 N.Y.S.2d 186 (1947) (natural father refused custody of his children in material part because he was an atheist and
his wife, the children's step-mother, merely an "easy-going Catholic.")
110 41 Ga. 184 (1870).
1 69 Ala. 25 (1881).
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involving infants there were four "automatic bars" and three "extremely unfavorables" with four "automatic bars" and two "extremely unfavorables" for cases involving children with previous
religious training. So far as the agencies are concerned, atheists
and agnostics are as a practical matter barred from serious consideration.
The judges, while on the whole definitely opposed to allowing
atheists to adopt, were again considerably more liberal than the
agencies and there was a strong minority having no objection
whatever. For infant cases where neither adoptive parent believes 22% would automatically bar the petition and 63% were
extremely opposed (51%) or opposed (12%). 15% however said
that the situation would either have no effect (12%) or only a
The respective percentages
slightly unfavorable effect (3%).
for cases involving children with previous religious training were
virtually identical. So far as the infant cases were concerned the
judges viewed the situation where one parent did not believe as
about the same as where neither parent believed. There was some
movement in favor of granting the petition but not much. 14%
would still automatically deny the petition, 68% were either extremely opposed (31%) or opposed (37%) while 19% either had
no objection (12%) or only a slight objection (7%). Cases involving children old enough to have had religious training however
were treated more liberally. Here only 7% would automatically
refuse the adoption with 65% extremely opposed (34%) or opposed
(31%) and 29% either having no objection (14%) or only a slight
objection (15%).
VI.

CONCLUSION

As the central object here has merely been to state what was
taking place little remains by way of conclusion. There are of
course numerous and fundamental policy questions lurking in
the background and not too far back. But these for the most part
cannot and will probably never be resolved and it is probably
better here not to even try. The research was a cooperative effort
and frankly in the end we find ourselves on the basic issues about
where we began. Hopefully however agreement is not in this
case the final test of merit and something of value can be gained
merely from learning something more of the evidence and what
we now do. In closing we extend our sincere thanks to the adoption agencies and to the many county judges who made the undertaking possible.
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APPENDIX A
County Judge Questionnaire
To the Honorable
County, Nebraska

County Judge,

Questionnaire on "Religion in Adoption Cases in Nebraska"
1. During the past two years, about how many adoption petitions have you:
Granted?

Denied?

2. Out of all the petitions you ruled on under Question 1, about how many
were:
a) Cases where the petitioner was a step parent (so-called "half-adoption"
cases)?
b) Cases, other than "half-adoption" cases, involving infants too young
to have received any religious training?
1) In about how many of such cases was the Board of Control or
some licensed adoption agency required to consent to the adoption
under § 43-105?

c) Cases, other than "half-adoption" cases, involving children old enough
to have received some religious training?
1) In about how many of such cases was the Board of Control or
some licensed adoption agency required to consent to the adoption
under § 43-105?
3. How often do you employ your discretionary power under § 43-107
to request an investigation of the adoptive parents and the child by
the Board of Control or by some licensed adoption agency where, but
for your action, no Board of Control or agency investigation would be
be made: (Check item which blst describes what you do.)
a) In cases, other than "half-adoption" cases, involving infants too
young to have received any religious training?
AlwaysGenerally Occasionally
Never
b) In cases, other than "half-adoption" cases, involving children old
enough to have received some religious training?
Never
Occasionally
Always Generally
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4. In adoption cases, other than "half-adoption" cases, involving INFANTS
TOO YOUNG TO HAVE RECEIVED ANY RELIGIOUS TRAINING
a) To what extent do you inquire (or request counsel to inquire) as to
the following matters (assuming, of course, that you are not already
in possession of such information):
1) The major basic faith of the natural mother (Catholic, Protestant,
Jewish)?
Always
- Generally
- Occasionally Never
2) Whether the infant has been dedicated to a major basic faith
(Catholic, Protestant, Jewish) by a ritual such as baptism?
Always
Generally
- Occasionally
- Never
3) Whether the adoptive parents are church members?
AlwaysGenerallyOccasionally Never
4) The name(s) of the major basic faith(s) of the adoptive parents
(Catholic, Protestant, Jewish)?
Always

Generally

-

Occasionally

-

Never

5) The name(s) of the particular religious sect(s) or denomination(s)
to which the adoptive parents belong (Baptist or Presbyterian,
for example, in the case of Protestants)?
Always
Generally
Occasionally Never
6) The regularity of church attendance by the adoptive parents?
Always
- Generally
Occasionally Never
7) Whether, though the adoptive parents may both be members of
the same sect (Methodist, for example), they both attend the same
church of that sect?
Always
Generally
Occasionally
- Never
8) Whether the infant will receive formal religious training if the
petition is granted (Sunday school, church, formal church membership)?
Always
Generally
- Occasionally
Never
9) The name of the particular sect or sects in whose doctrines the
child will be instructed and in whose church or churches he will
receive training?
Always
Generally
Occasionally
- Never
b) In the class of cases under consideration, how would the following
situations probably affect your decision?
For each situation, please check that description which best describes
your probable reaction. And if the situation mentioned was ever
one of the factors in causing you to deny a petition, please also circle
the description you have checked.
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1) The infant has been dedicated to a major basic faith (Catholic,
Protestant, Jewish) by a ritual such as baptism and will be raised
in a different major basic faith (Catholic instead of Protestant,
for example).
Automatic bar - Extremely unfavorable - Unfavorable Only slightly unfavorable No effect 2) The infant has not been dedicated to a major basic faith by a.
ritual such a baptism but the infant will be raised in a major
basic faith different from that of his natural mother (Protestant
instead of Catholic, for example).
Automatic bar - Extremely unfavorable - Unfavorable Only slightly unfavorable - No effect 3) Neither of the adoptive parents is a church member.
Automatic bar - Extremely unfavorable
Unfavorable
Only slightly unfavorable - No effect

-

4) The adoptive mother is a church member but the adoptive father
is not.
Automatic bar Extremely unfavorable - Unfavorable
Only slightly unfavorable - No effect 5) The adoptive father is a church member but the adoptive mother
is not.
Automatic bar - Extremely unfavorable - Unfavorable Only slightly unfavorable - No effect 6) Though the adoptive parents both belong to the same church, they
seldom attend.
Automatic bar Extremely unfavorable - Unfavorable Only slightly unfavorable - No effect 7) Though the adoptive parents both belong to the same church,
one seldom attends though the other regularly attends.
Automatic bar - Extremely unfavorable
Unfavorable
Only slightly unfavorable - No effect 8) Neither adoptive parent believes in God.
Automatic bar - Extremely unfavorable
Only slightly unfavorable - No effect

Unfavorable

-

-

9) One adoptive parent believes in God while the other does not.
Automatic bar - Extremely unfavorable - Unfavorable Only slightly unfavorable
- No effect 10) The adoptive parents belong to different branches of the Protestant
faith (Methodist and Baptist, for example), and each regularly
attends his own respective church.
Automatic bar Extremely unfavorable - Unfavorable Only slightly unfavorable No effect -
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11) The adoptive parents have different major basic faiths (Protestant
and Catholic or Jewish and Protestant, for example), and each
regularly attends his own respective church.
Automatic bar - Extremely unfavorable Unfavorable
Only slightly unfavorable No effect
12) Both adoptive parents are religious but neither believes in nor
practices an organized religion.
Automatic bar - Extremely unfavorable - Unfavorable
Only slightly unfavorable No effect
5. In adoption cases, other than "half-adoption" cases, involving CHILDREN
OLD ENOUGH TO HAVE RECEIVED RELIGIOUS TRAINING,
a) To what extent do you inquire (or request counsel to inquire) as to
the following matters (assuming, of course, that you are not already
in possession of such information):
1) Whether and to what extent the child has been instructed in the
tenents of a major basic faith (Protestant, Catholic, Jewish) and
the name of such faith?
Always
Generally
Occasionally
Never
2) The name of the particular religious sect or denomination in
whose doctrines the child may have been instructed (Baptist or
Methodist, for example, in the case of a Protestant)?
Always

Generally

Occasionally

-

Never

3) Whether the adoptive parents are members of a church?
Always
Generally
Occasionally
Never
4) The name(s) of the major basic faith(s) of the adoptive parents
(Catholic, Protestant, Jewish)?
Always
Generally
Occasionally
Never
5) The name(s) of the particular religious sect(s) or denomination(s)
to which the adoptive parents belong (Baptist or Methodist, for
example, in case of Protestants)?
Always
Generally
Occasionally
Never
6) The regularity of church attendance by the adoptive parents?
Always
Generally
Occasionally
Never
7) Whether, though the adoptive parents are both members of the
same sect (Methodist, for example), they both attend the same
church of that sect?
Always
Generally
Occasionally
Never
8) Whether the child will receive formal religious training if the
petition is granted (Sunday school, church, formal church membership)?
Always
Generally
Occasionally
Never
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9) The name(s) of the particular sect or sects in whose doctrines the
child will be instructed and in whose church or churches he will
receive training?
Always
Generally Occasionally
- Never
b) In the class of cases under consideration, how would the following
situations probably affect your decision?
For each situation, please check that description which best describes
your probable reaction. And if the situation mentioned was ever
one of the factors in causing you to den a petition, please also circle
the description you have checked.
1) While both adoptive parents have the same major basic faith
(Catholic, Protestant or Jewish), such major basic faith is different from the major basic faith in which the child has received
training (both adoptive parents are Catholic, for example, while
the child has had Protestant training).
Automatic bar - Extremely unfavorable Unfavorable
Only slightly unfavorable No effect 2) The child has had instruction in one major basic faith (Catholic,
Protestant or Jewish), and one adoptive parent has the same
major basic faith while the other has a different major basic
faith (the child, for example, has had Protestant training and
one of the adoptive parents is Protestant, the other Catholic).
Automatic bar - Extremely unfavorable - Unfavorable
Only slightly unfavorable - No effect 3) The child has had instruction in one branch of the Protestant
faith (Baptist, for example), and the adoptive parents, though
Protestants, belong to a different branch (Methodist, for example).
Automatic bar - Extremely unfavorable - Unfavorable
Only slightly unfavorable

-

No effect

-

4) The child has had some religious instruction (Catholic, Protestant
or Jewish), and neither adoptive parent believes in God.
Automatic bar - Extremely unfavorable Unfavorable
Only slightly Unfavorable - No effect 5) The child has had some religious instruction (Catholic, Protestant
or Jewish), and one adoptive parent believes in God while the
other does not.
Automatic bar Extremely unfavorable - Unfavorable
Only slightly unfavorable - No effect -

We should, of course, be delighted to receive any comments or suggestions you might like to make either with regard to the questionnaire
or on the subject of religion in adoption cases or on any other phase
of the adoption process. Space for this purpose is provided below.
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APPENDIX B
Agency Interview Schedule
1. Do you ask applicants for adoption questions concerning their religious
affiliation?
YES:
NO:
If "Yes": What questions do you ask them?
Religion?
Denomination?
Church Attendance?
Other Church Activities?
For Denominational Agencies:
2. Does your Agency only consider applicants for adoption who are
Catholics?
Lutherans?
Jews?
If "No": Does your Agency consider applicants from all Religious
Denominations?
YES:
NO:
If "No": What lines do you draw in this matter? (E.g., protestants,
catholics, agnostics and atheists)

For Non-Sectarian Agencies:
3. Does your Agency consider applicants for adoption from all religious
faiths and denominations, or does it exclude some of them?
CONSIDERS ALL:
EXCLUDES SOME:
If "Excludes Some": Which ones does your agency exclude?
Catholic: _
Lutheran: _
Jewish: _
Other:
4. Does your Agency only consider applicants for adoption, both of whom
belong to the same religious faith?
YES:
NO:
If "no": What combinations of religious affiliation do you consider?
Do you take into account the strength of religious conviction in cases
where parents have different religions when considering their application?
YES:
NO:
If so, what factors do you take into account in making your decision?
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5. What are the religious denominations of parents from whom your
Agency accepts children for placement with adoptive parents?

6. Do you only place children with adoptive parents who have the same
religious affiliation as the child?
YES:
NO:
If "No":

What is your policy on this matter?

7. How do you determine the religious affiliation of the child placed for
adoption?
MOTHER'S RELIGION:__ FATHER'S RELIGION:OTHER:__
If "Both Mother and Father" and these are different:
make your decision?

How do you

8. Do you endeavor to place children whose natural parents have very
deep religious beliefs with adoptive parents who are also deeply religious?
YES:
NO:
And, suppose, the natural parents are merely nominal members of
a religious group, do you endeavor to find similar adoptive parents?
YES:
NO:
If "Yes" to either of the above:
of religious conviction?
Of the Natural Parents:
Of the Adoptive Parents:

How do you determine the strength

9. Does your Agency have any minimum requirements for religious activity on the part of applicants for adoption, which if not met, result
in your refusing to accept the application?
YES:
NO:
If "Yes": What are these requirements?
Official Church Membership:
Regular Church Attendance:
Other Church Activities:
Other Religious Observances:
Supporting Reference from Minister:
Other:

How Regular?

If "No" to Question 9: Would your Agency consider an application for
adoption from atheists or agnostics?
YES:
NO:
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10. Apart from these minimum requirements, what standard of religious
conviction and/or activity do you prefer in your applicants?
(If different from the minimum requirements, put an "X" against the
appropriate items in Question 9.)
11. Would an overemphasis on religion influence your Agency to deny
an application for adoption?
YES:
NO:
If "Yes": What would you consider an "overemphasis" in religion?
12. To what extent does your Agency investigate the reliability of your
applicants' statements with respect to their religious beliefs and practices?
13. In the past five years, how frequently have, applicants been turned
down or not accepted by your agency because they were:
Frequently: Seldom: Never:
Atheists or Agnostics:
Not sufficiently religious:
Husband and Wife of different religions:
14. Do you strictly enforce all of these standards you have mentioned, or
do you occasionally, in exceptional circumstances, relax any of them?
YES:
NO:
If "Yes":

Which one(s) do you relax and how frequently?
Agency

Name and Title of
person interviewed:
Date of interview:
Name of Interviewer:

